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TRUST IN GOD GOING TOO FAR:  INDIANA’S 
“IN GOD WE TRUST” LICENSE PLATE 
ENDORSES RELIGION AT TAXPAYER 
EXPENSE 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On a September morning in 1814, as the smoke settled from a battle 
the night before, the sun rose in the eastern sky, and the morning dew 
began to dissipate, Frances Scott Key, inspired by a flag that remained 
flying through the night, wrote what would become the United States 
National Anthem.1  The fourth stanza, in particular, is often claimed to 
herald for the first time what would develop into the phrase “In God We 
Trust.”2  It states in part, 
 
Blest with vict’ry & peace may the heav’n-rescued land 
Praise the Power that hath made & preserv’d us a nation! 
Then conquer we must, when our cause it is just. 
And this be our motto—“In God is our Trust[.]”3 
 
“In God We Trust” did not resurface on the national scene until 1864 
when it appeared on United States currency.4  After World War II and 
                                                 
1 The Star Spangled Banner, http://americanhistory.si.edu/ssb/6_thestory/6b_osay/ 
fs6b.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2007) (citing Stanza four of the poem written by Francis 
Scott Key after he witnessed an 1814 battle at Fort McHenry and saw the American flag 
flying the next morning amidst all of the smoke from the battle).  See OSCAR GEORGE 
THEODORE SONNECK, REPORT ON “STAR-SPANGLED BANNER” “HAIL COLUMBIA” “AMERICA” 
“YANKEE DOODLE” 7–42 (Dover Publ’n, Inc. 1972) (providing an interesting insight on the 
Star Spangled Banner). 
2 Encyclopedia Smithsonian:  Star-Spangled Banner and the War of 1812, 
http://www.si.edu/Encyclopedia_SI/nmah/starflag.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2007).  The 
Star Spangled Banner was not officially adopted as the national anthem of the United States 
until 1931 when President Herbert Hoover signed it into law.  Id. 
3 SONNECK, supra note 1, at 37. 
4 ACLU of Ohio v. Capitol Square Rev. & Advisory Bd., 243 F.3d 289, 311 (6th Cir. 2001) 
(noting that one reason “In God We Trust” was placed on the national currency was the 
religious fervor during the Civil War).  See generally Willard B. Gatewood, Theodore 
Roosevelt and the Coinage Controversy, 18 AM. Q. 35, 45 (1966), available at 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2711109 (discussing the history of Theodore Roosevelt’s 
crusade to redesign the currency because he felt it was sacrilegious to place a Deity on a 
coin, and also discussing the great backlash President Roosevelt received as a result of 
maintaining his position that the phrase “In God We Trust” should be removed from the 
national currency).  See also U.S. Treasury—Fact Sheet on the History of “In God We Trust,” 
http://www.treas.gov/education/fact-sheets/currency/in-god-we-trust.shtml (last 
visited Sept. 23, 2007).  The idea of placing “In God We Trust” on the currency first passed 
into legislation by an Act of Congress on April 22, 1864, authorizing the phrase to appear 
on the two-cent coin.  Id.  The Secretary of the Treasury received numerous letters from 
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the increased threats of Communism and its non-religious practices, 
Congress adopted “In God We Trust” as the national motto.5  References 
to God in the public sphere have become increasingly common; for 
example, Indiana’s General Assembly designed Indiana license plates 
                                                                                                             
religiously devout peoples urging the United States to recognize God on United States 
coinage.  Id.  The United States Treasury website posted an excerpt from one of the letters 
written by a minister from Pennsylvania which stated in part, 
Dear Sir:  You are about to submit your annual report to the 
Congress respecting the affairs of the national finances.   
One fact touching our currency has hitherto been seriously 
overlooked.  I mean the recognition of the Almighty God in some form 
on our coins.   
You are probably a Christian.  What if our Republic were not 
shattered beyond reconstruction?  Would not the antiquaries of 
succeeding centuries rightly reason from our past that we were a 
heathen nation?  What I propose is that instead of the goddess of 
liberty we shall have next inside the 13 stars a ring inscribed with the 
words PERPETUAL UNION; within the ring the allseeing eye, 
crowned with a halo; beneath this eye the American flag, bearing in its 
field stars equal to the number of the States united; in the folds of the 
bars the words GOD, LIBERTY, LAW.   
This would make a beautiful coin, to which no possible citizen 
could object.  This would relieve us from the ignominy of heathenism.  
This would place us openly under the Divine protection we have 
personally claimed.  From my hearth I have felt our national shame in 
disowning God as not the least of our present national disasters.   
To you first I address a subject that must be agitated. 
Id.  Since the phrase “In God We Trust” was first placed on the two-cent coin in 1864, 
Congress eventually placed it on the rest of the nation’s coinage and other forms of paper 
currency over the years.  Id. 
5 See generally Proclamation No. 8038, 71 Fed. Reg. 43,343 (Aug. 1, 2006).  See also The 
White House Website:  50th Anniversary of Our National Motto, “In God We Trust,” 2006, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/07/20060727-12.html (last visited Sept. 
23, 2007) (referencing President Bush’s Proclamation celebrating the 50th anniversary of “In 
God We Trust” as the national motto that was originally signed into law by President 
Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1956).  See, e.g., ACLU of Ohio v. Capitol Square Rev. & Advisory 
Bd., 210 F.3d 703, 721 (6th Cir. 2000), rev’d en banc, 243 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 2001).  Courts that 
have addressed the issue surrounding the constitutionality of the motto have upheld it 
claiming that “In God We Trust” has little or nothing to do with government endorsement 
of religion.  Id. at 721.  Other such public references to God appeared on the national scene 
during the 1940s and 1950s amidst the height of the Cold War.  Id. at 722 (describing the 
official adoption of the Pledge of Allegiance in 1942 and the words “one nation under God” 
being inserted in 1954).  The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that there were strong 
religious reasons for inserting the references to God in the Pledge of Allegiance and 
adopting “In God We Trust” as the national motto, and that these decisions were heavily 
influenced by the threat from abroad and the strong conflicting views on human morality 
that the United States and the Soviet Union held.  Id.  See also ACLU of Ohio, 243 F.3d at 301 
(pointing out that the phrase “In God We Trust” has also been displayed on government 
buildings and even above the chair where the Speaker of the House of Representatives sits 
while Congress is in session).   
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bearing the phrase “In God We Trust[,]” and these plates are available to 
Indiana citizens for the same cost as regular license plates.6 
Specialty license plates are nothing new on America’s roadways.7  In 
fact, specialty license plate programs are a great source of revenue for the 
sponsoring organization, while they cost the state and its taxpayers little 
or nothing at all.8  Whereas many specialty license plates simply promote 
local sports teams or universities, other plates have proved to be more 
controversial.9  One instructive example is the “Choose Life” license 
plate sponsored by various pro-life groups.10  Indiana’s “In God We 
                                                 
6 IND. CODE § 9-18-24.5-1-5 (2006) (covering the availability of the “In God We Trust” 
license plate, its design, and the applicable fee); see also H.R. 1013, 114th Gen. Assem., 2d 
Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2006).  See Editorial, ‘In God We Trust’ is Costly Specialty Plate, MERRILLVILLE 
POST-TRIBUNE, Apr. 1, 2007, at A12 (discussing that the fee for funding this license plate is 
borne by all citizens of Indiana whether they have the plate or not because the fee is drawn 
from the state highway fund).  The article alleges that the state has spent $3.89 per plate 
and over one million dollars total to produce the “In God We Trust” license plates.  Id.; 
Editorial, Furthermore, FORT WAYNE J. GAZETTE, Apr. 11, 2007, at 12A (noting that one in 
four drivers has the “In God We Trust” plate and that money from the state’s Motor 
Vehicles Highway Account has covered the cost of these plates totaling more than 1.5 
million dollars thus far at $3.69 per plate). 
7 Andy G. Olree, Specialty License Plates:  Look Who’s Talking in the Sixth Circuit, 68 ALA. 
LAWYER 212 (2007).  Although the days of clever alphanumeric combinations to display a 
message by motorists are not over, states since about the 1980s have taken messages on 
license plates even further by offering specialty plate programs.  Id.  See Michael W. 
Hoskins, Fees Drive License Plate Legal Challenge, 18-5 IND. LAWYER 1, 25 (2007).  Specialty 
plates allow motorists to express their love for their local university, the environment, or 
any other number of interests on a license plate that is usually distinctive in look with a 
special design different from the traditional state plate.  Id.   See also Olree, supra, at 213 
(Some states have twenty to thirty different specialized plates from which to choose, while 
other states have as many as 500 choices); Traci Daffer, Note, A License to Choose or a Plate-
ful of Controversy?  Analysis of the “Choose Life” Plate Debate, 75 UMKC L. REV. 869, 869–70 
(2007) (explaining that as of June 2006 there were over 84,371 different specialty license 
plates available for motorists across the country, and in June 2003, forty-one states had 
specialty plate programs available). 
8 Daffer, supra note 7, at 870 n.8 (demonstrating that as of early 2007, specialty plate 
programs raised 41.2 million dollars for space-related programs in Florida).  See also ACLU 
of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that the “Choose Life” message 
on license plates constituted government speech, and the license plates were constitutional 
because Tennessee controlled the message and approved the words used on the plate).  But 
see Planned Parenthood of S.C. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that “Choose 
Life” specialty plates were a mix of both government and private speech and were thus 
unconstitutional on the basis of viewpoint discrimination). 
9 See infra notes 10–11. 
10 See generally Daffer, supra note 7 (exploring the controversy regarding the “Choose 
Life” plate debate and the various litigation that has arisen).  Daffer discussed the existing 
case law surrounding this issue and the circuit split as to whether the “Choose Life” plate 
should be classified as government or private speech.  Id.  See also Sarah E. Hurst, A One 
Way Street to Unconstitutionality:  The ‘Choose Life’ Specialty License Plate, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 957 
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Trust” license plate, which prominently displays the motto “In God We 
Trust[,]” has also spawned much debate among supporters and critics.11  
For example, the Indiana American Civil Liberties Union challenged this 
license plate as violating the Indiana Constitution’s privileges and 
immunities clause, but importantly for this Note, did not allege a First 
Amendment violation.12  This lawsuit has since been dismissed on 
summary judgment in favor of the state.13  Yet, Indiana is not alone in 
                                                                                                             
(2003) (discussing that the “Choose Life” plates in various states should be held 
unconstitutional, in part for violating the Establishment Clause). 
11 See P.J. Huffstutter, A Fight to Put the Brakes on a License Plate Law, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 29, 
2007, at 14 (discussing the controversy surrounding Indiana’s “In God We Trust” license 
plates and the pending litigation by the Indiana ACLU). 
12 Hoskins, supra note 7, at 1 (explaining that the basis for the litigation is not about 
religion but about fairness).  The lawsuit was initiated on behalf of an Allen County 
resident and filed in Marion Superior Court on Apr. 23, 2007.  Id.  This resident purchased 
an environmental plate, which carries a fee of forty dollars, part of which is an 
administrative fee to produce the plate and the rest of which is designated to the respective 
organization in support of its cause.  Id.  The resident contended that the “In God We 
Trust” plate carried a message and in fact was promoted by the Indiana Bureau of Motor 
Vehicles (“BMV”) as a “no fee” specialty plate, but unlike other specialty license plates that 
promote a cause or message, the “In God We Trust” plate did not require an administrative 
fee to cover the cost of production.  Id.; see also Ken Kusmer, BMV Faces Lawsuit Over ‘In 
God We Trust’ Plates, EVANSVILLE COURIER & PRESS, Apr. 24, 2007, at B6 (explaining the basis 
for the lawsuit filed by the Indiana Civil Liberties Union).  See Indiana Bureau of Motor 
Vehicles:  Indiana’s License Plates, http://www.in.gov/bmv/3999.htm (last visited Sept. 
22, 2007) (describing the plate as a “no-fee” specialty plate).  But see Indiana Bureau of 
Motor Vehicles:  Indiana’s License Plates, http://www.in.gov.bmv.platesandtitles/plates 
(last visited Oct. 26, 2007) (describing the “In God We Trust” license plate as the “state’s 
first alternative regular plate”).  According to the Bureau’s website, “This year, the Indiana 
Bureau of Motor Vehicles is offering 12 new license plates, including the state’s new ‘no-
fee’ specialty plate featuring an ‘In God We Trust’ design, and a new ‘Support Our Troops’ 
military plate.”  Id.  Furthermore, the website mentions that those “who purchase special 
recognition license plates” shall pay certain fees listed, including group fees, administrative 
fees of which the “In God We Trust” plate is exempt, and registration charges.  Id.  The 
“Support Our Troops” plate appears not to require an administrative fee either, although it 
does require a twenty-dollar group fee that supports the “Military Family Relief Fund.”  Id.  
Thus, the classification of the “In God We Trust” plate as a specialty plate was not entirely 
clear because there were mixed statements regarding its status.     See generally IND. CONST. 
art. I, § 23 (stating the Equal Privileges clause of the Indiana Constitution “shall not grant to 
any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall 
not equally belong to all citizens[]”).   
13 See Niki Kelly, Judge Throws Out “In God” Tags Suit, Lack of Fee Challenged Appeal Likely, 
FORT WAYNE J. GAZETTE, Aug. 18, 2008, at 1C (noting that a Marion County Judge granted 
summary judgment in favor of the State of Indiana in the litigation brought by the ACLU 
challenging Indiana’s new “In God We Trust” plates).  Ken Falk, attorney for the ACLU, 
said that “[w]e weren’t challenging the message of ‘In God We Trust,’ just that any other 
message plate has a cost to it[.] . . . ”  Id.  Furthermore, the trial court agreed with the state 
in finding that the plate is a regular plate, and not a specialty plate.  Id.  See also Court Sides 
with BMV on ‘God,’ License Plate Fees Ruled this Decision Should Be Left to General Assembly, 
EVANSVILLE COURIER & PRESS, Apr. 18, 2008, at B7 (quoting  Judge Gary L. Miller, who 
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referencing God on its license plates.  Nearly a dozen other state license 
plates display “In God We Trust” or “God Bless America[,]” but unlike 
Indiana’s plates, most of them have been issued as specialty plates, 
which means that a driver who wants one must pay an additional fee for 
it.14 
                                                                                                             
decided the case, “Courts are not to second-guess the Indiana General Assembly when it 
comes to calculations of this sort[.] . . . ”).   
14 The following states charge a fee for the plate and clearly label it as a specialty plate 
on their motor vehicles website:  Arkansas, Iowa, Louisiana, Missouri, Mississippi, North 
Carolina, Ohio, Tennessee, and Texas.  See Arkansas (specialty license plate bears the 
phrase “In God We Trust”), available at http://www.arkansas.gov/dfa/motor_vehicle/ 
mv_plates_detail.php?pl_id=87; Iowa (specialty license plate bearing the phrase “God Bless 
America”), available at http://www.dot.state.ia.us/mvd/ovs/plates/bless.htm; Louisiana 
(specialty license plate bears the phrase “In God We Trust”), available at http://omv.dps. 
state.la.us/Special%20Plates/SpecialPlates_display.asp (Select “In God We Trust” plate); 
Missouri (specialty license plate displaying the phrase “God Bless America with a 
depiction of the Statute of Liberty”), available at http://dor.mo.gov/mvdl/motorv/plates/ 
(under “choose a design category and organization,” click on the drop down box and select 
“organizational,” then choose “God Bless America” and enter any text into box below and 
hit “submit”); Mississippi (specialty license plate bearing the phrase “God Bless America”), 
available at http://www.mstc.state.ms.us/mvl/tag_img/Godbles.jpg; North Carolina 
(specialty license plate containing the phrase “In God We Trust” with a “Support our 
Troops” ribbon displayed on the plate as well), available at https://edmv-
sp.dot.state.nc.us/sp/SpecialPlatesPortal.html (click on “special plate viewers,” select 
“special interest plate,” and select “In God We Trust”); Ohio (specialty license plate bearing 
the phrase “One Nation Under God”), available at https://www.oplates.com/Name 
Lookup/PlateLookupWizard1.asp?ID=LCBUWDAFIEMTDTZKQHZBEUSBDYRFXMJWT
DNJMQBWGUHRSPNOLK (select “Passenger Car,” click “submit,” then select “One 
Nation Under God” and click “View this plate”); Tennessee (specialty license plate 
exhibiting the phrase “In God We Trust” with an image of a Bald Eagle on the plate as 
well), available at http://www.tennessee.gov/revenue/vehicle/licenseplates/misc/ 
miscdesc.htm#eagle; Texas (specialty license plate displaying the phrase “God Bless 
America” along with a picture of a Bald Eagle), available at http://rts.texasonline.state.tx. 
us/NASApp/txdotrts/SpecialPlateOrderServlet?grpid=60&pltid=84?nbr=121&type=OT.  
Alabama and South Carolina offer specialty plates that display the phrase “God Bless 
America” or “In God We Trust” as well, but these states, like Indiana, do not charge a fee.  
See Alabama (specialty license plate bearing the phrase “God Bless America”), available at 
http://www.revenue.alabama.gov/motorvehicle/specialty.html, and South Carolina 
(specialty license plate displaying the phrase “In God We Trust”), available at 
http://www.scdmvonline.com/DMVNew/PlateGallery.aspx?q=Specialty.  See also Jessica 
Gresko, Florida Debates License Plates, State Would Be First in Nation to Offer Specialty Plates for 
Christians, CHARLESTON GAZETTE & DAILY MAIL, Apr. 24, 2008, at 3A (discussing the Florida 
Legislature’s consideration of creating an “I Believe” specialty plate to promote Christian 
beliefs).  The design would contain a Christian Cross, stained glass window, and the words 
“I Believe.”  Id.  If created, Florida’s plates would require a fee in addition to the regular 
administrative fee because of its status as a specialty plate.  Id.  Indiana’s “In God We 
Trust” plate does not require an extra fee costing the same as the standard issue plate.  Id.  
At this point the author of this Note is not aware of any litigation regarding the 
constitutionality of the “I Believe” plate or the Florida legislature’s ability to create such a 
license plate. 
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Irrespective of those dozen or so states, this Note contends that 
Indiana’s “In God We Trust” license plate raises serious Establishment 
Clause and speech subsidy concerns because of the improper religious 
motivation behind the creation of the license plate and the State’s failure 
to charge a fee for those who want to display the “In God We Trust” 
message.15  This Note explores the tangled web of Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence and its convergence with the expanding breadth of 
government speech relating to compelled subsidies.  In doing so, this 
Note exposes the constitutional problems posed by Indiana’s “In God 
We Trust” license plate.  To this end, Part II explores the history and 
development of the United States Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause 
decisions, along with the free speech and freedom of association 
problems that arise when the government compels citizens to pay for a 
message promulgated by the government.16  Part III applies current 
Establishment Clause and compelled subsidy tests to Indiana’s license 
plates, demonstrating the deficiencies in the current doctrines to 
adequately address the “In God We Trust” message on the license 
plates.17  Part IV suggests that the “In God We Trust” license plate 
should be found unconstitutional because the Indiana General Assembly 
attempted to mask its religious purpose and is now compelling its 
citizens to subsidize a private message.18   
Accordingly, this Note proposes that courts should use Justice 
Breyer’s six interpretative tools—text, history, tradition, precedent, 
                                                 
15 Hoskins, supra note 7, at 1.  See generally Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 
240 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).  Capturing the reflective nature of the more current 
American “melting pot” society that was not present upon our nation’s founding, Justice 
Brennan noted: 
[O]ur religious composition makes us a vastly more diverse people 
than were our forefathers.  They knew differences chiefly among 
Protestant sects.  Today the Nation is far more heterogeneous 
religiously, including as it does substantial minorities not only of 
Catholics and Jews but as well of those who worship according to no 
version of the Bible and those who worship no God at all. 
Id. 
16 See infra Part II (discussing the various tests used by courts when reviewing the 
constitutionality of governmental displays containing religious symbols and the analysis 
adopted by courts when determining whether a governmentally compelled subsidy is 
occurring). 
17 See infra Part III (suggesting that Indiana’s “In God We Trust” license plate violates 
the Establishment Clause because the legislator who created the plate had an improper 
purpose, essentially endorsing religion, and also because by not charging a fee to cover the 
cost of production of the license plate, Indiana compels its citizens who disagree with the 
religious message to pay for the plate so that other citizens can display the message). 
18 See infra Part IV.  See also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICIES 1224–25 (3d ed. 2006) (noting that the departure of Justice O’Connor from the 
composition of the Court would likely affect future Establishment Clause determinations).  
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purpose, and consequences—when analyzing the Indiana’s “In God We 
Trust” license plate and other Establishment Clause cases.19  
Additionally, courts, especially when dealing with license plates, should 
adopt the following four-factor test when analyzing a compelled subsidy 
speech issue:  (1) determine the purpose behind the license plate; (2) 
determine who maintains editorial control of the message on the plate; 
(3) determine who is identified as the actual speaker of this message—
government or private actor; and (4) determine who is held accountable 
for the speech.20  Moreover, this Note advises future legislators, who are 
considering similar license plates, to demonstrate a clear secular purpose 
and to classify the plates as specialty license plates that require 
individual owners to pay an additional fee.21 
II.  BACKGROUND 
Part II presents a brief history of Establishment Clause jurisprudence 
and surveys the legal backdrop of compelled subsidies doctrine relating 
to government speech.22  Part II.A focuses on the tests used to determine 
when religious displays by the government are constitutional under the 
Establishment Clause, as well as the possible underlying coercive and 
psychological effects of government messages.23  Part II.B discusses the 
two main approaches to the compelled speech doctrine and conflicting 
appellate court tests used to determine who is speaking.24 
A. Establishment Clause Jurisprudence 
A key concern surrounding the “In God We Trust” license plate is 
the possible violation of the Establishment Clause.25  Although the 
                                                 
19 See infra Part IV; see also Dahila Lithwick, Scalia and Breyer Sell Very Different 
Constitutional Worldviews, SLATE, Dec. 6, 2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2154993/ (last 
visited Nov. 20, 2008). 
20 See infra notes 126–32 (adopting the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals four-part test as 
used in Planned Parenthood of South Carolina, Inc v. Rose). 
21 See infra Part V. 
22 See infra Parts II.A–B. 
23 See infra Part II.A. 
24 See infra Part II.B. 
25 See ACLU of Ohio v. Capitol Square Rev. and Advisory Bd., 210 F.3d 703, 712 (6th Cir. 
2000), rev’d en banc, 243 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 2001) (noting the very fine factual distinctions 
often drawn in Establishment Clause cases).  See also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at 1182 
(discussing the effects of the incorporation of the Establishment Clause, which was first 
recognized by the Supreme Court in Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947)).  However, 
according to Justice Thomas, the Establishment Clause should not be applied to the states 
because it was written only to prevent the national government from establishing a 
religion.  Id.  Adoption of Justice Thomas’s view would drastically reshape the confines of 
Kulwinski: Trust in God Going Too Far: Indiana's "In God We Trust" License P
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2009
1324 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43 
Founding Fathers likely expressed religious sentiments, they vehemently 
expressed competing views about the meaning of the Establishment 
Clause.26  To this day, religion has continued to play an integral role in 
                                                                                                             
the power delegated to states and local municipalities and essentially provide free reign to 
those entities to advance or inhibit religion in whatever context they saw fit.  Id. 
26 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 632–36 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing the 
history and traditions of religion in this country, particularly the use of prayer in the public 
sector).  Other examples demonstrating an entanglement between the state and religion 
include references to a higher being within the Declaration of Independence, the common 
use of Bibles for swearing in public officials, and references by Presidents to God in their 
inaugural addresses.  Id. at 633–34; see also Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686–90 (2005) 
(offering more visually apparent references to the tradition of using religious symbols in 
American society).  See NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD 247 (Farrar, Straus & Giroux 2005) 
(“Madison himself understood that paying the chaplains of the House and Senate out of 
public funds was a constitutional anomaly, and he wisely suggested that the Congress 
ought to pay for their services from their own pockets.”); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 
U.S. 209, 235 n.31 (1977) (quoting Madison and Jefferson regarding the dangers of 
government forcing a person to monetarily contribute to support any establishment, and 
noting that Jefferson stated that “to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the 
propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical[]”).  But see Marsh v. 
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 788 (1983) (“Clearly the men who wrote the First Amendment 
Religion Clauses did not view paid legislative chaplains and opening prayers as a violation 
of that Amendment, for the practice of opening sessions with prayer has continued without 
interruption ever since that early session of Congress.”).  See also DARIEN A. MCWHIRTER, 
THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 4 (The Oryx Press 1994) (citation omitted).  Despite 
the entanglement of religion with the nation’s early history, many of the founders strongly 
advocated a separation between the state and religion.  Id.  In summation, one of the more 
famous statements capturing the essence of separation of church and state was made by 
Thomas Jefferson, 
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between 
man and his God; that he owes account to none other for his faith or 
his worship; that legislative powers of the government reach actions 
only, and not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act 
of the whole American people which declared that their legislature 
should “make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof,” thus building a wall of 
separation between church and State. 
Id.  See generally Deborah Jones Merritt & Daniel C. Merritt, The Future of Religious 
Pluralism:  Justice O’Connor and the Establishment Clause, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 895 (2007), for an 
interesting discussion of the development of the religion clauses and the influence that 
religion has played in the nation’s founding.  The Merritt article documents the colonial 
period and the established religions that were held in some of the colonies.  Id. at 898–904.  
The article provides statistical analysis concerning how Americans felt toward religions in 
general and the passions and violence that such feelings created.  Id. at 918–29.  In fact, one 
study detailed the power of the Evangelical Christian voting bloc in the 2000 presidential 
election that proposed a theory of “religious threat” as one motivational tool for the group 
to turn out in high numbers to vote.  Id. at 929–30.  See generally MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL, 
JOHN H. GARVEY, AND THOMAS C. BERG, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 1–100 (Aspen 
Law & Business 2002) (discussing the history of the Establishment Clause and the religious 
tension that has existed in the country even prior to its founding); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 
18, at 1184–85 (discussing that the Founding Fathers held three main points of views, which 
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the nation’s development.27  Over time, three views have emerged for 
interpreting the Establishment Clause—strict separation, neutrality, and 
accommodation.28  The current religious and political climate in the 
                                                                                                             
have shaped both the courts’ and society’s current understanding of the Establishment 
Clause and its meaning).  Chemerinsky cited to Professor Laurence Tribe who noted that 
there was the “evangelical view[,]” associated with Roger Williams, which sought to 
protect religion from the worldly corruptions of the state.  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at 
1184.  There was also the view held by Jefferson who wanted to insulate the government 
and secular institutions from the ecclesiastical incursions (building a wall of separation), 
and the view of Madison, which sought to decentralize the power between the state and 
religion to promote the healthy competition of ideas, both secular and religious, so that no 
one sect was favored over another.  Id. 
27 School Dist. Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 237–38 (1963).  Justice Brennan 
highlighted the dangers of using history as a guiding principle when seeking the true 
meaning of the Establishment Clause: 
A too literal quest for the advice of the Founding Fathers upon the 
issues of these cases seems to me futile and misdirected for several 
reasons[.] . . . [T]he historical record is at best ambiguous, and 
statements can readily be found to support either side of the 
proposition.  The ambiguity of history is understandable if we recall 
the nature of the problems uppermost in the thinking of the statesmen 
who fashioned the religious guarantees; they were concerned with far 
more flagrant intrusions of government into the realm of religion than 
any that our century has witnessed.  While it is clear to me that the 
Framers meant the Establishment Clause to prohibit more than the 
creation of an established federal church[,] . . . they gave no distinct 
consideration to the particular question whether the clause also 
forbade devotional exercises in public institutions. 
Id. (footnote omitted).  See, e.g., FELDMAN, supra note 26, at 199–200 (noting that since the 
Marsh v. Chambers decision, there has been a rising of values-based evangelicalism, 
beginning with the Christian Conservative movement in 1984 to ensure control over the 
changing Supreme Court).  See generally CNN website, New Huckabee ad appeals to 
Christian conservatives, http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/01/01/huckabee. 
christians/index.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2008) (reflecting this trend in the 2008 Presidential 
Primary campaigns, which included discussions about faith and values, the Christian 
Coalition voting bloc, and accusations of political advertisements containing “Christian” 
messages and symbolism); MSNBC website, Huckabee stands by ‘Christ’ comment, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22443302/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2009) (same); MSNBC 
website, Romney: No religious test for president, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/ 
22129738/ (last visited Jan. 2, 2007) (stressing his religious beliefs and his support for 
religion in the public sphere in an attempt to qualm some voters anxieties concerning his 
Mormon faith). 
28 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at 1192–98 (discussing more broadly the three 
approaches used by the Court in approaching Establishment Clause jurisprudence).  Strict 
interpretation is often most aligned with Jefferson’s wall of separation, and any violation of 
this principle imposes a coercive effect on the citizens to comply either explicitly or 
implicitly with the consequence of feeling like an outsider for noncompliance.  Id. at 1192.  
Neutrality theory is best exemplified by the view of Justice O’Connor who articulated that 
the Court should look to the “reasonable observer” in determining the effects of the law.  
Id. at 1193–96.  Although this approach is often criticized as ambiguous and difficult to 
apply, a majority of the Court, at least as it was comprised a few years ago, seems to have 
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United States embodies these diverging views—a climate which many 
people believe has contributed to the polarization of the nation.29  
Indeed, recent litigation in Indiana clearly reflects this religious strife.30 
                                                                                                             
adopted this approach, which seeks to minimize the concern of making people potentially 
feel like outsiders.  Id. at 1196.  The other approach used by the Court is the 
accommodation theory, which is by far the most expansive literal approach to the 
Establishment Clause.  Id.  Essentially, under the accommodation theory, the government 
would violate the Establishment Clause only if it were to literally establish a house of 
worship.  Id.  This interpretation more closely resembles Justices Kennedy’s and Scalia’s 
coercion theory, mandating equal treatment of both religious and non-religious groups.  Id. 
at 1196–97.   
29 STEVEN P. BROWN, TRUMPING RELIGION:  THE NEW CHRISTIAN RIGHT, THE FREE SPEECH 
CLAUSE, AND THE COURTS 1 (Univ. of Ala. Press 2002) (highlighting the new political 
agenda by the Christian right to “reclaim America”). A convention that was held in Fort 
Lauderdale in 1996 offered a series of workshops to help train concerned Christians on 
how to put their faith into action in the public arena.  Id.  At the conclusion of the 
conference, the following sentiments were offered: 
For more than thirty years, America has undergone a sustained and 
wide-ranging attack on the godly foundation which made our nation a 
well-ordered bastion of liberty, peace, and prosperity.  That attack is 
finally meeting resistance.  More and more Christians are awakening 
to their duty to defend faith and freedom in an increasingly hostile, 
secular society.  Now more than ever, they have discovered the need to 
reclaim America. 
Id.; see also Debra Lemoine, Judge Gets Arguments on School Board Meeting Prayers, BATON 
ROUGE ADVOCATE, Sept. 10, 2004, at 1 (explaining how a local group of conservative 
Christians were able to organize and form a Community Network that was able to 
successfully get a minister appointed to the local school board to help advance the group’s 
agendas).  See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional 
Change:  From Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 
489, 515–16 (2006) (noting that the Rehnquist Court signaled a change in how the religion 
clauses should be interpreted, and this change continued throughout President George W. 
Bush’s presidency).  The authors elaborated, 
There has been a distinct and genuine move from the Warren and early 
Burger Court’s general hostility to government support of religion to a 
new theory of “neutrality” . . . . The Court now places relatively few 
barriers in the way of state or federal funds going to religious schools 
or other religious organizations so long as the purpose is not a naked 
preference for religious versus secular organizations.  Some advocates 
believed—some with horror, some with joy—that this portended a full 
180 degree turn, in which the Supreme Court would define 
“neutrality” as requiring support for religious education so long as 
nonreligious education received support. . . .  
[I]t is impossible to estimate the shelf life of the Court’s twin—and 
many would say incoherent—decisions in McCreary County v. ACLU 
and Van Orden v. Perry regarding government-supported displays of 
religion in the public square.  In these two cases, the Court struck 
down a publicly supported display of the Ten Commandments in 
Kentucky, but upheld one in Texas.  Justice Kennedy was in dissent in 
McCreary County, and in the plurality in Van Orden.  Given that he is 
the new swing Justice, this means that Van Orden, which gave local 
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Recently in Hinrichs v. Bosma,31 four Indiana taxpayers alleged that 
prayers used to open legislative sessions in the Indiana General 
Assembly were sectarian in nature and highly favorable of the Christian 
faith.32  The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the preliminary 
                                                                                                             
governments far greater leeway to place religious iconography in 
public places, probably represents the wave of the future.  One can 
nevertheless imagine a wide range of different possible directions for 
Establishment Clause and Free Exercise doctrine, depending on 
remaining opportunities for President Bush to make appointments 
before his term expires in January 2009, the results of the 2006 elections 
(which might shift control of the Senate or weaken the Republican 
majority there), and, perhaps most importantly, the winner of the 2008 
presidential election.  It is worth noting, however, that a Democratic 
appointment replacing Justice Stevens in 2009 would likely preserve 
the current status quo that features Kennedy as the swing Justice, 
while replacing Stevens with a strong conservative would have a much 
more significant impact on the jurisprudence of the religion clauses[] 
. . . .  
Id. (footnotes omitted).  See generally Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/government/fbci/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2007) (displaying 
information regarding the Office of Faith Based Initiatives, an office President Bush 
created, and claiming that the office’s mission  is “Compassion in Action”);  Posting Jay 
Sekulow, In God We Trust - Protecting Our National Motto, American Center for Law & 
Justice (Apr. 2006), http://www.aclj.org/News/Read.aspx?ID=2201 (last visited Feb. 7, 
2009) (describing the importance of the national motto and the commitment by the 
American Center for Law & Justice to defend the religious heritage of the United States of 
America).  But see Posting Erwin Chemerinsky, Time to Fight the Religious Right to THE 
HUFFINGTON POST http://www.huffingtonpost.com/erwin-chemerinsky/time-to-fight-
the-religio_b_8048.html?view=screen (Sept. 28, 2005, 21:48 EST) (discussing that the 
greatest threat to the nation’s freedom comes from the religious right and that efforts 
should be put in place to counter their influence).  See generally Mark Stricherz, Primary 
Colors:  How a Little-Known Task Force Helped Create Red State / Blue State America, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Nov. 23, 2003, available at http://www.boston.com/news/globe/ideas/articles/ 
2003/11/23/primary_colors/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2007) (pointing out the sharp political 
divisions in the country by concluding that in the sixteen years of the study, there has 
never been a wider gap between red and blue states). 
30 Eddie Baeb, Indiana’s Christians to Fight Ruling, BUFFALO NEWS (New York), Dec. 15, 
2005, at A9 (referencing a study from Indiana University that claimed roughly 82% of 
Hoosiers identified themselves as Christian while less than one percent identified as Jewish 
or Muslim).  See generally ‘In God We Trust’ is Costly Specialty Plate, supra note 6, at A12 
(acknowledging that Indiana is a conservative state, and noting that its choice to offer its 
citizens a license plate that references God is not surprising).   
31 440 F.3d 393, 403 (7th Cir. 2006), rev’d, Hinrichs v. Speaker of the House of Rep. of Ind. 
Gen. Assembly, 506 F.3d 584 (7th Cir. 2007).  See Anne Abrell, Note, Just a Little Talk with 
Jesus:  Reaching the Limits of the Legislative Prayer Exception, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 145 (2007), for 
an in-depth analysis of the Hinrichs case and legislative prayer. 
32 Hinrichs, 440 F.3d at 395–97.  Hinrichs contained many examples of legislative prayers 
consisting of direct references to Jesus Christ that were often sectarian and focused on the 
Christian faith.  Id. at 395–96.  In fact, one of the legislative sessions opened up with a song 
titled, “Just a Little Talk with Jesus.”  Id. at 395.  See also Posting of Don Byrd to Blog from 
the Capital, http://www.bjconline.org/cgi-bin/2007/11/7th_circuits_bosma_reversal_sh. 
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injunction ordered by the lower court to preclude these prayers, and 
held that the prayers likely violated the Establishment Clause.33  After 
the court upheld the injunction, the Indiana General Assembly re-
instituted legislative prayers, making sure that these prayers were non-
sectarian in nature.34  Representative Woody Burton, who authored the 
legislation for the “In God We Trust” license plates, responded to this re-
institution of prayer in the Indiana General Assembly by saying that he 
was “tickled to death” that prayer was again permitted in the House 
                                                                                                             
html (November 1, 2007 19:37) (discussing the effect of the Hein decision on taxpayer 
standing challenges and in view of Establishment Clause concerns). A Jewish lobbyist 
group traveled to Indianapolis to lobby state senators and representatives and had an 
exchange with Speaker Bosma regarding Hinrichs, which was in litigation at the time, and 
afterward, one lobbyist, Mr. Don Byrd,  had the following comments: 
Speaker Bosma wondered why we hadn’t discussed the controversy 
surrounding the issue of prayer in House chambers.  He told us his 
version of what happened and what he believes, and a passionate 
exchange took place.  The end of this exchange left us, the Jewish 
delegation, in shock.  Speaker Bosma, defending the prayer issue, 
asked, “How many Jews are there in Indiana?  About 2%?  There are at 
least 80% Christians in Indiana.” 
Id.  Mr. Byrd, a Rabbi with the Jewish delegation, felt that Speaker Bosma’s statement 
provided insight into some of the sentiments that reside within the General Assembly and 
the perceived majority rule attitude. Id.  Mr. Byrd worried that these sentiments are 
increasingly common as a result of the Court’s recent Establishment Clause and taxpayer 
standing jurisprudence.  Id. 
33 Hinrichs, 440 F.3d at 402–03 (holding that a court-ordered stay, which would permit 
the sectarian prayers to continue, was not warranted because Speaker Bosma failed to meet 
his burden of showing that the opposing parties did not have standing and that the 
Establishment Clause was not violated).  But see Hinrichs v. Speaker of the House of Rep. of 
Ind. Gen. Assembly, 506 F.3d 584 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that Indiana taxpayers did not 
have standing to challenge the alleged violation of the Establishment Clause concerning the 
General Assembly’s prayer session and its sectarian overtones).  The Seventh Circuit 
reversed its earlier decision based on the Court’s recent decision in Hein v. Religious Freedom 
Foundation, 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007).  Id. at 590.  Although the Seventh Circuit noted that, 
a pecuniary interest is not the only means of establishing standing. . . .  
In the context of an alleged Establishment Clause violation, we have 
stated that “allegations of direct and unwelcome exposure to a 
religious message” are sufficient to show the injury-in-fact necessary to 
support standing. 
Id. at 590 n.5 (citation omitted).  The Hinrichs court noted the factual importance of the 
plaintiffs dropping their alternative reason for standing, which was that Mr. Hinrichs was 
no longer personally affected by the sectarian prayers because he was no longer going to be 
engaged as a lobbyist at the statehouse.  Id.  Therefore, the only alleged basis for standing 
was the basis of taxpayer standing, which was denied in light of Hein.  Id.   The Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit gave a detailed analysis of the Hein decision and its effect 
on Establishment Clause challenges under taxpayer standing.  Id. at 590–600.  The court 
noted that past Supreme Court decisions held that the same standing requirements for 
federal taxpayers applied to state taxpayers as well.  Id. at 592, 596 n.6. 
34 Indiana House Opens with a Hope and a Prayer, EVANSVILLE COURIER & PRESS, Jan. 9, 
2007, at A1. 
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because it is a long tradition that should be continued.35  Burton’s 
legislative record also contains a history of supporting legislation that 
contains religious overtones, such as a ban on gay marriage.36 
Representative Burton has tried to downplay the religious message 
affiliated with the “In God We Trust” license plates, but some of his 
statements can be interpreted to reveal religious motives.37  For example, 
on the one hand, Burton stated that he hoped that the new license plates 
“would be embraced by ‘both patriots and those of faith.’”38  On the 
                                                 
35 See id. (referencing the litigation that was appealed to the Seventh Circuit regarding 
non-sectarian legislative prayer conducted during Indiana’s legislative session). 
36 See Steve Walsh, ‘In God We Trust’ Makes Statement, MERRILLVILLE POST-TRIBUNE, Mar. 
21, 2007, at A3.  See Burton: Private, Not State, Funds Gay Center, FORT WAYNE NEWS 
SENTINEL, Oct. 7, 1994, at 8A.  Representative Burton has also been outspoken in the 
Indiana legislature on some other topics that are controversial.  Id.  Burton opposed public 
funding for an office at Indiana University that would benefit gay and lesbian students, 
and he was one of the most vocal critics.  Id.  Instead, he urged the students and university 
to seek private funding, even though the student government, faculty leaders, and board of 
trustees had already expressed their approval for the public funds to be used for the office.  
Id.  Burton posited what seems to be an apparent contradiction because the “In God We 
Trust” license plates that he helped create use public funding: 
Failure to stop funding for the GLB [Gay, Lesbian, Bi-Sexual] office 
will encourage cultural centers for other minority groups, such as “fat 
people, skinny people, Nazis, pro-choice people and pro-life 
groups”. . .“[s]hould we spend $50,000 for each of those special interest 
groups[]”. . . .“[i]t is my opinion that this is where we draw the line.”  
Id.  Burton planned to propose an amendment that would cut five-hundred thousand 
dollars from the university’s budget if the university decided to fund the center.  Id.   
37 See Niki Kelly, BMV Unveils “God” Plate for ‘O7, FORT WAYNE J. GAZETTE, Aug. 11, 
2006, at 8C (discussing the availability of the newly designed license plate offered in early 
2007 to Indiana residents at no extra charge).  “Seeing the ‘In God We Trust’ license plate 
come to life is a momentous occasion for everyone involved[.]”  Id. (quoting Representative 
Woody Burton, a Republican lawmaker from Greenwood, Indiana).  “It is my hope that 
thousands of Hoosiers will choose this plate and display it proudly.”  Id. (quoting Mr. 
Burton);  Deanna Martin, In God We Trust License Plate Clears Senate Committee, AP ALERT, 
Feb. 8, 2006, available at WL APALERTPOLITICS 20:29:16 (quoting Representative Burton 
as having stated that the “In God We Trust” license plates concerned our nation’s heritage 
and promoted “an important motto from American history[]”); see also Associated Press, 
Plates Put Trust in God, MERRILLVILLE POST-TRIBUNE, Jan. 7, 2006, at A9 (quoting 
Representative Burton as stating, “What I want is exactly what it says on the dollar 
bill[.] . . . Nothing more[]”) (quotations omitted).  On the other hand, some statements by 
Representative Burton seem to relay his implicit promotion for religion, even if a 
monotheistic one.  See State Puts ‘Trust’ in New Plates, EVANSVILLE COURIER, Jan. 21, 2007, at 
B1 (quoting Representative Burton, “I’m a faith-based person, anyways, [sic] and there had 
been so much attack on religion throughout this country[]”).  See generally Plates Put Trust 
in God, supra, at A9 (referencing that for the second consecutive year, Representative Burton 
advocated for legislation to support “In God We Trust” license plates).  Burton has made it 
a point at times to mention that the license plates are not specifying any one god.  Id. 
38 Huffstutter, supra note 11, at 14.  See Woody Burton—He Listens. He Cares. He Takes 
Action., http://www.woodyburton.com/ (last visited on Oct. 13, 2007) (providing a link to 
Representative Burton’s legislative website containing various photographs depicting his 
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other hand, some of his statements, such as, “I’m a Christian, but I don’t 
care if you’re Christian or Jewish or Muslim []. . . .  Your god may not be 
my god, but this is still a country that’s based on faith.  Why can’t you 
tout that on your license plate?”, reveal a faith-based motivation.39  
Burton’s reasons for introducing the “In God We Trust” license plates 
are relevant to the Establishment Clause discussion because his personal 
incentives shed light on the purpose of the license plates.40  To illustrate 
the intricate nature of the Establishment Clause, Part II.A.1 discusses 
cases involving governmental displays of religious symbols.41 
1. Making “Lemon”ade from Lemons:  The Lemon Test and Its 
Application 
In Lemon v. Kurtzman,42 the Supreme Court adopted a three-part test 
that is commonly used to examine displays of religious symbols 
challenged pursuant to the Establishment Clause.43  To pass 
                                                                                                             
involvement with the “In God We Trust” license plate; click on “Legislative History” in the 
drop down scroll).  One of the photographs is Representative Burton presenting a license 
plate to his pastor.  Id.  See also Indiana House of Representatives Republican Caucus:  State 
Representative Woody Burton, http://www.in.gov/legislative/house_republicans/ 
homepages/r58/meet.html (last visited on Oct. 13, 2007) (containing information about 
Representative Burton on his legislative web page).  See also Posting of Advance Indiana:  
In Burton Brothers Eric Trusts, http://advanceindiana.blogspot.com/2005/05/in-burton-
brothers-eric-trusts.html (May 20, 2005, 16:58 EST).  The author acknowledges that the 
neutrality of this website is not known, but merely uses it to present people’s sentiments on 
various legal topics in Indiana. 
39 Huffstutter, supra note 11, at 14 (quotations omitted). 
40 See generally infra Part II.A.1. 
41 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (upholding a crèche display, which was 
located in a Christmas display, constitutional in part because of the several secularized 
displays surrounding it); cf. Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Ch., 492 U.S. 
573 (1989) (holding that a crèche display on the grand staircase of the county courthouse 
violated the Establishment Clause because it endorsed religion).  In rendering its opinion, 
the Court emphasized the contextual placement of the display and its close relation with 
perceived endorsement of religion by the government.  Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 598–602.  The 
plurality noted that the term endorsement is closely related to the term promotions and 
that “any endorsement of religion [i]s ‘invalid[.]’”  Id. at 593–95.  The plurality rejected 
Justice Kennedy’s proselytization test, which required more accommodation by the 
government for religious purposes.  Id. at 602.  The Court in Allegheny also noted other 
areas where the Establishment Clause had been violated, such as state-sponsored prayer in 
public schools, displaying the Ten Commandments in public school classrooms, and 
conditioning the holding of public office by requiring the belief in an existence of God.  Id. 
at 591 nn.40–41. 
42 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
43 Id. at 612–13.  See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 603 n.4 (1992) (noting that “[s]ince 
1971, [it] has decided 31 Establishment Clause cases[]” and all have employed the Lemon 
test, except Marsh v. Chambers 463 U.S. 783 (1983)).  See generally STEPHEN V. MONSMA, 
WHEN SACRED AND SECULAR MIX RELIGIOUS NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS AND PUBLIC 
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constitutional muster, a governmental display containing religious 
symbols must have a secular purpose; its principal or primary effect 
must be one that does not endorse or inhibit religion; and it must not 
foster “an excessive government entanglement with religion.”44  Justice 
O’Connor narrowed the focus of Lemon’s purpose and effects prongs by 
adding the consideration of whether a reasonable observer would view 
the purpose or primary effect of the government’s display of religious 
symbols as endorsing religion.45  Although the Court normally defers to 
                                                                                                             
MONEY 111–17 (Rowman & Littlefield 1996) (proposing that the government should adopt a 
position of neutrality, remove itself from certain policy-oriented messaging, and neither 
favor nor inhibit religion).  Monsma posits an interesting view of this theory through the 
guise of higher education by claiming that if the government were to remove itself from the 
business of financially supporting higher education, then both the secular and religious 
institutions would be on a level playing field.  Id. at 114.  Monsma suggests that the 
distinction between sacred and secular is too easily blurred and difficult to apply 
consistently and that a neutral approach would avoid this distinction entirely.  Id. at 116. 
44 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13.  For purposes of this Note, the two factors of the Lemon test 
most applicable are the purpose and endorsement prongs. 
45 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687–94.  See also ACLU of Ohio v. Capitol Square Rev. & Advisory 
Bd., 210 F.3d 703, 713–15 (6th Cir. 2000), rev’d en banc, 243 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 2001) 
(referencing Justice O’Connor’s concurring view that the main question to address when 
seeking the purpose for the law is whether a reasonable observer would find that the 
government was endorsing religion); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (quoting Justice O’Connor who 
said, “[t]he effect prong asks whether, irrespective of government’s actual purpose, the 
practice under review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval[]”).  
(emphasis omitted).  See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985) (determining that the main 
issue was “whether the government’s actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of 
religion[]”).  However, sometimes Justice O’Connor’s statements are presented as a 
separate test, best exemplified when she stated: 
The endorsement test does not preclude government from 
acknowledging religion or from taking religion into account in making 
law and policy.  It does preclude government from conveying or 
attempting to convey a message that religion or a particular religious 
belief is favored or preferred.  Such an endorsement infringes the 
religious liberty of the nonadherent, for “[w]hen the power, prestige 
and financial support of government is placed behind a particular 
religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious 
minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is 
plain.” 
Id. at 70 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  See also Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v. 
Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 779-780 (1995) (discussing Justice O’Connor’s articulation as to the 
“reasonable person[,]” likening it to the reasonable person often used in tort law).  The 
general standard of endorsement relies on what a member of the overall community would 
find offensive, as opposed to what a highly sensitive person may find offensive.  Id.  See 
generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at 1202–06 (providing a general overview of the 
Lemon test in its current form and the uncertain future of the test especially with the ever 
evolving make-up of the Court). 
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the state legislature’s articulation of a secular purpose, such articulation 
must nonetheless “be sincere and not a sham.”46 
To determine whether a governmental display of religious symbols 
violates the Establishment Clause, the Court looks to the content of the 
display (i.e., the components of the display, including any text exhibited 
therein), any legislative history concerning the display’s creation, the 
historical development of the display, and the contextual placement of 
the display.47  Van Orden v. Perry48 and McCreary County v. ACLU of 
Kentucky,49 decided on the same day, demonstrate how the Court 
evaluates whether the placement of religious symbols on government 
property violates the Establishment Clause.50  Both cases involved the 
display of the Ten Commandments on government property.51  Yet, after 
                                                 
46 Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 586–87 (1987) (discussing that where deeper 
investigation reveals that the stated purpose is superfluous, merely inventing a secular 
purpose to circumvent an Establishment Clause violation will not suffice).  The Court was 
presented with a Louisiana law that sought to prohibit the teaching of evolution in public 
schools unless it also taught creationism as an alternative theory to promote academic 
freedom.  Id. at 581–82.  The Court conducted a deeper investigation into the legislative 
history that led it to conclude that the Balanced Treatment Act was unconstitutional for 
lacking a secular purpose.  Id. at 596–97.  The Court highlighted the personal statements by 
the legislator who helped to enact the bill, such as, “evolution is contrary to his family’s 
religious beliefs[,]” and “I view this whole battle as one between God and anti-God 
forces[.]”  Id. at 593, n.14.  See also McCreary Cty., Ky., v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 859–65 
(2005) (discussing the continued importance of Lemon’s purpose prong and its effect on the 
constitutionality of the overall act or display at issue). 
47 Edwards, 482 U.S. at 594–95 (discussing the process of ascertaining the purpose behind 
a law or a governmental display).  Justice Powell’s concurrence further elaborated on this 
concept, although he noted, “[a] religious purpose alone is not enough to invalidate an act 
of a state legislature.  The religious purpose must predominate.”  Id. at 597–99 (Powell and 
O’Connor, JJ., concurring).  Justice Powell acknowledged the historical significance of 
religion in this country and noted that the Bible, if used in a historical context, can be 
utilized in an educational setting.  Id. at 605–06.  He noted that the Bible is the “world’s all-
time best seller” and contains “literary and historic value apart from its religious content.”  
Id. at 608.  However, Justice Scalia suggested that the Court, when determining the purpose 
as required by Lemon, meant to determine the “actual” purpose behind the legislative 
action and whether the legislature “acted with a ‘sincere’ secular purpose,” not simply 
what the out-of-context “legislative purpose” may be.  Id. at 613–14 (Rehnquist, C.J. and 
Scalia, J., dissenting).  Justice Scalia also noted that the Court, at least at the time of the 
Edwards decision, had only invalidated previous laws or displays containing religious 
references when it was wholly motivated by a religious purpose.  Id. at 614. 
48 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (plurality opinion). 
49 545 U.S. 844 (2005). 
50 See infra notes 53–63 and accompanying text. 
51 Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 681 (involving a challenge by a Texas resident to a monument 
displaying the Ten Commandments on the grounds of the Texas State Capitol as violating 
the Establishment Clause); cf. McCreary, 545 U.S. 844, 881 (involving displays of the Ten 
Commandments inside Kentucky courthouses and holding that the displays violated the 
Establishment Clause). 
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evaluating the placement and development of these monuments, the 
Court reached two different conclusions regarding whether the Ten 
Commandments displays violated the Establishment Clause:  in Van 
Orden, the Court determined that the display did not violate the 
Establishment Clause, whereas in McCreary, the Court determined that 
the display did violate the Establishment Clause.52 
In Van Orden, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote a four-justice plurality 
opinion that failed to apply all three prongs of the Lemon test and instead 
pointed to the long legislative history discussing religion’s impact on the 
formation of the country as the underpinning of its analysis.53  The Ten 
Commandments monument in question had been placed on the grounds 
of the Texas State Capitol alongside several other primarily secular 
monuments representing the state’s diverse history.54  The Court 
determined that it must distinguish whether the display of the Ten 
Commandments was merely passive or whether it actively confronted 
                                                 
52 Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 703 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that, unlike Van Orden, 
McCreary was different because of the short and turbulent history surrounding the display, 
which revealed that the true purpose behind the display was to endorse religion).  See Ind. 
Civil Liberties Union v. O’Bannon, 259 F.3d 766, 768 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting that Indiana 
recently faced a legal challenge to a Ten Commandments monument).  Indiana originally 
had a monument on its state capitol grounds like the one in Van Orden until it was 
destroyed by a vandal and subsequently replaced with the monument that prompted the 
litigation.  Id.  The replacement monument was found to violate the Establishment Clause 
even though it contained some historical messages on it.  Id. at 773.  The Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals found that the new monument failed Lemon’s purpose prong and its 
primary effect was to endorse religion, in part because of the large text displayed on the 
monument conveying the Ten Commandments and also because of the monument’s visible 
placement on the Statehouse grounds.  Id. at 770–73.  The court noted that even though the 
Ten Commandments may have a secular purpose, the state retains the burden of proving 
that it has taken the appropriate steps to prevent a religious purpose.  Id. at 771. 
53 Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 682–92.  Essentially, the Court applied part of O’Connor’s 
modified Lemon test when it determined that, taking into consideration the various factors 
that established the monument’s placement, a reasonable observer would not likely find 
that the monument endorsed religion.  Id.  The Court did not fully apply the Lemon test but 
instead determined that the test was inapplicable to the current situation.  Id. at 686.  The 
Court noted that in certain contexts, such as school classrooms, the placement of such 
religiously affiliated displays has been held unconstitutional.  Id. at 690.  But here the Court 
emphasized the passage of time before the placement of the monument was challenged as 
well as the identifiable dual significance of the display which seemed to demonstrate that 
the religious effects of the display were merely incidental to the display’s main purpose.  
Id. at 691–92. 
54 Id. at 682.  The Court noted that the monument in question had been on display for 
more than forty years and was surrounded by seventeen other monuments and twenty-one 
“historical markers,” many of which were secular items that were significant to the 
development and identity of Texas’s history.  Id.  The monument was also paid for by 
private funds and clearly inscribed on it was the following message:  “[p]resented to the 
people and youth of Texas by the Fraternal Order of Eagles of Texas 1961.”  Id. at 681–82. 
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passersby.55  The plurality found that the monument was merely passive, 
evidenced by the fact that the petitioner had walked past the monument 
for years prior to bringing the lawsuit.56  Ultimately, the Court held that 
the placement of the monument did not violate the Establishment Clause 
because “[s]imply having religious content or promoting a message 
consistent with a religious doctrine does not run afoul of the 
Establishment Clause.”57  Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment, 
providing the critical fifth vote, stressing that the purpose behind the 
monument was primarily secular, noting that its physical placement on 
the capitol grounds among several other non-religious displays and its 
visibility for more than forty years without objection were reasons that 
strongly favored upholding the constitutionality of the Ten 
Commandments monument.58 
                                                 
55 Id. at 691–92; see also ACLU Neb. Found. v. City of Plattsmouth, Neb., 419 F.3d 772, 
776–77 (8th Cir. 2005), rev’g en banc, 358 F.3d 1020 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that a similar Ten 
Commandment display donated by the Fraternal Order of Eagles more than thirty-five 
years prior did not violate the Establishment Clause).  Plattsmouth dealt with a Ten 
Commandments display similar to the one at issue in Van Orden.  Plattsmouth, 419 F.3d at 
773–75.  The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the display did not violate 
the Establishment Clause for many of the same reasons articulated in Van Orden.  Id. at 775–
78.  Furthermore, the Plattsmouth display was also not legally challenged based on its 
constitutionality for some thirty-five years, insulating the display from invalidation on 
endorsement claims similar to Van Orden because any perceived sectarian nature 
surrounding the display lost its effect over time and the display became more passive.  Id. 
at 778.  There was a factual difference between  Plattsmouth and Van Orden: the display in 
Plattsmouth stood by itself and was not surrounded by other secular displays to detract 
from its potential religious message, as was the case in Van Orden.  Id. at 777 n.7. 
56 Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 691–92. 
57 Id. at 690 (noting that the placement of the Ten Commandments on the grounds of the 
capitol was more passive than the display of the Ten Commandments in a school 
classroom, which more directly confronts people).  See also Alan E. Garfield, What Should 
We Celebrate on Constitution Day?, 41 GA. L. REV. 453, 485–89 (2007) (discussing the history 
of the monuments and the parties in the lawsuit, and pointing out how the monuments 
made their way to the grounds of the Texas State Capitol).  Interestingly, the monuments 
were part of a publicity stunt by Cecil B. DeMille for his movie, The Ten Commandments.  Id. 
at 485.  DeMille garnered the support of the Fraternal Order of Eagles, a group founded by 
theater owners, to help erect the monuments around the country.  Id. at 485–86.  The 
monuments were unveiled for public display near the time that the movie opened in 
theaters with the help of Charlton Heston and Yul Brynner, both star actors in the movie.  
Id. at 486.  It was not until forty years later when a homeless, hard-on-his-luck Texas 
attorney who passed this monument every day for many years decided to bring suit 
challenging it.  Id.  Garfield described the passionate feelings of both those who wanted to 
preserve the religious symbols and those who called for separation.  Id. at 487–90. 
58 Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 698–704 (Breyer, J., concurring).  Justice Breyer disagreed with 
the plurality’s heavy reliance on the broader historical background of religion in the 
country and instead argued for a more pragmatic and fact-sensitive approach.  Id. at 698–
99.  Justice Breyer also acknowledged that the Fraternal Order of Eagles, a private 
organization that is primarily secular in nature, had donated the monument to recognize 
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On the other hand, in McCreary, the Court held that the placement of 
the Ten Commandments display in two Kentucky county courthouses 
violated the Establishment Clause.59  The Court focused its analysis on 
the purpose prong of the Lemon test and emphasized that the ever-
changing history behind the placement of the Ten Commandments 
revealed that the display lacked the required secular purpose; indeed, 
the Court found that the display had been driven by religious 
motivation.60  The Court recognized that a Ten Commandments display 
                                                                                                             
the role of the Ten Commandments in shaping civic responsibility.  Id. at 701.  Likewise, the 
placement of the monument on the capitol grounds demonstrated nothing sacred, 
evidenced further by the fact that for more than forty years, passersby apparently did not 
view the monument as endorsing religion, or at least no one had ever initiated litigation 
over the issue.  Id. at 702–03.  See also ACLU of Ohio v. Capitol Square Rev. & Advisory Bd., 
210 F.3d 703, 721 (6th Cir. 2000), rev’d en banc, 243 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that 
Ohio’s motto, “With God All Things Are Possible[,]” did not offend Lemon’s three pronged 
test, even though the phrase was taken from Matthew 19:26, because it was enough 
removed from its original biblical source such that a reasonable observer would not view it 
as endorsing religion).  “The reasonable observer, much like the reasonable person of tort 
law, is the embodiment of a collective standard and is thus ‘deemed aware of the history 
and context of the community and forum in which the religious display appears.’”  ACLU 
of Ohio, 210 F.3d at 721. 
59 McCreary Cty., Ky., v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 873–74 (2005) (holding that 
although Lemon’s purpose prong may not always by itself be dispositive, it nonetheless 
remains important when determining whether a law or religious display violates the 
Establishment Clause; to be sure, the context in which a display was created and also its 
development over time must not be overlooked because these facts often provide insight 
into the purpose behind a display). 
60 Id. at 851–74.  The Court discussed the historical development of the display, which 
McCreary County had altered three times; each alteration attempted to modify the overall 
display by adding more items to it to give it a secular purpose.  Id. at 850.  For instance, 
McCreary County added to the display  “historical” items like the Magna Carta, the 
Declaration of Independence excerpting the words “endowed by their Creator[,]” and one 
document stating that “[t]he Bible is the best gift God has ever given to man[.]”  Id. at 853–
54 (alteration in original).  The Court pointed out that “‘the display [was][to] be posted in ‘a 
very high traffic area’ of the courthouse.’”  Id. at 851 (second alteration in original).  
Although the Court acknowledged that purpose is an essential element to many 
constitutional doctrines, the Court is not required to look for some secret motive.  Id. at 
861–63.  The Court emphasized that the requisite secular purpose cannot be merely 
secondary, and Justice O’Connor has stated that the “secular purpose must be serious to be 
sufficient.”  Id. at 864–65 n.11.  But see Books v. Elkhart Cty., 401 F.3d 857, 858, 869 (7th Cir. 
2005) (holding that a  Ten Commandments display contained within a “Foundations of 
American Law and Government Display” at the local county government building did not 
violate the Establishment Clause because the “Foundations” display  contained various 
other secular items, which detracted from the Ten Commandments potential religious 
message, and the placement of the Ten Commandments in the overall display lacked any 
religious motivation).  Although this case was decided prior to McCreary, it appeared to 
suggest that the religious motivation must dominate and that a religious message need not 
be absent from the display.  Id. at 863; see Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 599 (1987) 
(stating, “A religious purpose alone is not enough to invalidate an act of a state legislature.  
The religious purpose must predominate[]”). 
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may potentially have either a secular or religious message.61  
Nonetheless, the majority applied Justice O’Connor’s modified Lemon 
test and held that, in this case, the Ten Commandments would likely be 
perceived as endorsing religion.62  Despite the county’s repeated 
attempts to secularize the display by adding other less religiously 
focused items to it, the Court noted that given the controversial history 
underlying the placement of the Ten Commandments, a reasonable 
observer would likely see the religious purpose behind the display.63 
Van Orden and McCreary highlight the Court’s diverging views 
regarding the Establishment Clause doctrine.64  The four justices who 
joined the plurality opinion in Van Orden likely would have upheld the 
Ten Commandments display in both cases, whereas the four dissenting 
justices in Van Orden likely would have invalidated both displays, 
finding that the government had endorsed religion.65  Only Justice 
Breyer saw a distinction between the monument in Van Orden and the 
monument in McCreary, finding the monument in Van Orden 
constitutional, but finding McCreary’s display unconstitutional.66  Van 
Orden and McCreary emphasize that the historical development behind 
                                                 
61 McCreary, 545 U.S. at 869, n.17 (acknowledging that the Ten Commandments have 
had an effect on the nation’s legal code and common law).  As Justice O’Connor stated in 
McCreary, “[i]t is true that many Americans find the Commandments in accord with their 
personal beliefs.  But we do not count heads before enforcing the First Amendment.”  Id. at 
884 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
62 Id. at 851–74. 
63 Id. at 866.  The County argued that if any purpose were to be inferred in this case, the 
court should determine the purpose only from the latest news concerning the event, not the 
display’s history in its entirety.  Id.  The Court responded by noting that “the world is not 
made brand new every morning, and the Counties are simply asking us to ignore perfectly 
probative evidence; they want an absentminded objective observer, not one presumed to be 
familiar with the history of the government’s actions and competent to learn what history 
has to show[.]”  Id. 
64 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at 1224–25 (providing an overview of Van Orden and 
McCreary, which resulted in opposite holdings, and highlighting the reasoning the Court 
applied in each case). 
65 Id. at 1224–25.  Van Orden’s plurality consisted of Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices 
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas.  Id.  The dissenters were Justices Stevens, O’Connor, Souter, 
and Ginsburg.  Id. 
66 Id.  See also Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 701-04 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).  
Unlike the four-justice plurality, Justice Breyer’s concurrence considered the purpose 
behind the displays and the consequences imposed on the reasonable observer for looking 
at it.  Id.   See also infra Part IV (discussing Justice Breyer’s six interpretative tools—text, 
history, tradition, precedent, the purpose of a statute (or display in this case), and the 
consequences—which Justice Breyer appeared to utilize when determining the proper 
result in Van Orden). 
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the creation of a governmental display containing religious symbols and 
its placement, contextually, may determine its constitutionality.67 
2. Follow the Leader:  Coercion Test and Group Norms 
Although McCreary served as a reminder that context and placement 
are important in determining the constitutionality of a religious symbol 
on government property, the potential effects that such a symbol may 
have on people should also be considered.68  In Lee v. Weisman,69 Justice 
Kennedy discussed the coercive effects of the use of prayer in schools.70  
In addition, coercion has also impacted some of the Court’s previous 
decisions, particularly those concerning religious symbolism.71  This 
Note next examines the Court’s two approaches to considering whether 
a religious symbol or message has a coercive effect, as well as 
psychological studies that reveal that individuals tend to have an 
underlying desire to conform to societal group norms.72 
                                                 
67 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at 1224–25 (noting that future cases will have to be 
judged in a highly contextual set of circumstances in order to determine the proper 
outcome).  Chemerinsky also speculated that with the departure of Justice O’Connor from 
the Court, similar cases could result in a dramatically different outcome.  Id.; see also Mike 
Schaps, Comment, Vagueness as a Virtue:  Why the Supreme Court Decided the Ten 
Commandments Cases Inexactly Right, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1243, 1260–61 (2006) (discussing the 
convoluted Establishment Clause doctrines, and noting that each case usually involves 
specific factual distinctions that determine its outcome). 
68 See infra Part II.A.2. 
69 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
70 Id. (holding that a prayer at a middle school graduation ceremony violated the 
Establishment Clause).  See also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at 1185 (noting that many 
cases involving the use of prayer and other religious activities in schools have been 
litigated). 
71 See generally Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (recognizing Justice Scalia’s physical 
coercion test and Justice Kennedy’s more psychologically based test); McCreary Cty., Ky. v. 
ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 866 (2005) (acknowledging the effects that posting the Ten 
Commandments in a public area may have on people).  See also Elizabeth B. Halligan, Note, 
Coercing Adults?:  The Fourth Circuit and the Acceptability of Religious Expression in Government 
Settings, 57 S.C. L. REV. 923, 925 (2006) (recognizing that the Supreme Court has addressed 
various public school prayer cases but has dealt with adult prayer only in the legislative 
prayer setting).  But see Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 789–92 (1983) (noting that 
legislative prayer is different than prayer in schools because it has been around since the 
founding of this country and adults are not as impressionable as children); Mellen v. 
Bunting, 327 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that the Virginia Military Institute’s dinner 
time prayer violated the Establishment Clause due to the coercive elements unique to the 
military college). 
72 See infra Parts II.A.2.a–b. 
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a. Coercion Jurisprudence 
Lee involved a challenge to invocations given during graduation 
ceremonies by a clergyman at the request of public school officials where 
middle and high school students were present.73  Although the 
invocations were nonsectarian in nature, Justice Kennedy noted that “[i]t 
is beyond dispute that, at a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that 
government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion 
or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way [that] ‘establishes a [state] 
religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.’”74  Justice Kennedy applied 
what is sometimes referred to as a psychological coercion test, 
emphasizing that the students were more impressionable than adults 
and the students did not have a “true” option to decide whether to 
attend the graduation ceremony.75  In addition, Justice Kennedy 
dismissed the argument that a nonsectarian prayer, or civic religion, 
should be allowed, and reasoned that the government should not 
involve itself in coordinating invocations to be delivered by clergymen at 
public school graduation ceremonies.76  The Court further noted that 
                                                 
73 Lee, 505 U.S. at 580–84 (citing copies of the prayers that were given by the Rabbi at the 
respective graduation ceremonies). 
74 Id. at 587 (third alteration in original).  See also Eric Brander, Hoosiers Choosing God 
Controversial ‘In God We Trust’ Plates Showing Up Everywhere, EVANSVILLE COURIER & PRESS, 
July 1, 2007, at A3 (noting that BMV Vehicles workers at various locations were allegedly 
“pushing” the “In God We Trust” plates on customers).  In fact, the state has since sent a 
memorandum to all employees stating as follows: 
“[w]e want to remind you that while we want to inform customers of 
plate selections, as good customer service, employees should not 
promote this plate, or any other plate, over another[.]” . . . .  “Some 
customers have suggested that some branch employees are pushing 
the IGWT plate to the exclusion of others.  As you are aware, this is not 
our policy.” 
Id. 
75 Lee, 505 U.S. at 592–96.  Justice Kennedy highlighted psychological evidence 
indicating that adolescents are more likely to be pressured by peers to conform their 
behavior to whatever the norm is than adults.  Id.  The Court noted that although student 
attendance at the ceremony was not required, it presented a student the difficult choice to 
either be exposed to the invocation or choose to miss the graduation ceremony despite 
having worked so diligently to graduate from high school.  Id. at 595.  Justice Kennedy 
noted the potential effects of remaining silent during the prayers and questioned whether 
such silence signified respect or subjected the student to subtle coercion.  Id. at 593.  Justice 
Kennedy also recognized the significance of the ceremony for the graduating student and 
her family, as well as the sense of accomplishment that accompanies such ceremonies or 
other similar events.  Id. at 595.  He dismissed the government’s position that the majority’s 
preference should prevail over the dissenting minority’s position and that individuals who 
associate with the minority position should simply not attend the ceremony if truly 
offended.  Id. at 596. 
76 Id. at 589–90 (noting that James Madison cautioned against having the government 
remove itself from the business of religion).  Justice Kennedy noted that the government 
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under the First Amendment not all religion must be removed from the 
public sphere, but that “the measure of constitutional adjudication is the 
ability and willingness to distinguish between [the] real threat and mere 
shadow.”77  The Court determined that under Lemon, the prayers at the 
graduation ceremony amounted to government endorsement of 
religion.78 
In sharp contrast, Justice Scalia’s dissent in Lee embraced historical 
evidence to support his contention that the nation is intertwined with 
religion and that such intertwinement does not amount to endorsement 
of religion.79  Justice Scalia explained that unconstitutional coercion 
occurs only when the government actually forces conduct or threatens 
the individual if he fails to act.80  Justice Scalia criticized Justice 
Kennedy’s psychological coercion test, describing it as unfounded and 
an “embarrassment” to the Establishment Clause.81  Indeed, the dissent 
dismissed psychologically coercive evidence and its potential underlying 
effects.82 
b. “In or Out”:  Group Norms 
Although psychological studies are not always well received by 
courts, extensive research has established the impact that symbolism and 
messages have on people.83  One aspect of this research deals with group 
                                                                                                             
should not show favoritism toward any religion.  Id. at 590.  “[I]n the hands of government 
what might begin as a tolerant expression of religious views may end in a policy to 
indoctrinate and coerce.”  Id. at 591–92.  See also Saumya Manohar, Comment, Look Who’s 
Talking Now:  “Choose Life” License Plates and Deceptive Government Speech, 25 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 229, 235–36 (2006) (discussing psychological theories that explain the dangers 
posed by the government endorsing a message through covert means).   
77 Lee, 505 U.S. at 598. 
78 Id. at 584–86. 
79 Id. at 632–36 (Rehnquist, C.J., White, Scalia, & Thomas, JJ., dissenting). 
80 Id. at 640–44.  
81 Id. at 636.  Justice Scalia compared the Court’s reliance on psychology to that of 
interior decorating, noting that the Court has delved into an area that it is not equipped to 
handle.  Id.  Justice Scalia dismissed the Court’s position that the students were essentially 
obligated to attend the ceremony and were therefore coerced.  Id.  Justice Scalia also 
questioned the Court’s protective nature toward students, especially those in high school 
who are old enough to vote, noting that the Court does not extend adults a similar 
protective blanket regarding the possible coercive effects of religious invocations at events.  
Id. at 639. 
82 See infra Part II.A.2.b. 
83 MUZAFER SHERIF, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SOCIAL NORMS 74 (Harper & Row 1966) 
(explaining how social norms can transform into powerful tools in group settings).  Sherif 
noted that some slogans or phrases, once they are standardized, can become so engrained 
in the public psyche that they can move people to action.  Id.  For instance, Sherif posits the 
phrases, “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity[,]” used during the French Revolution; “Life, 
Liberty, and the pursuit of happiness[,]” common to the United States revolution; and “[t]o 
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norms.84  The theory of group norms is that members of a group 
influence each other, which leads to relative uniformity in the beliefs and 
behaviors of the individuals within the group.85  This theory is founded 
on the idea that an individual’s desire to espouse a view that is deemed 
correct is outweighed by the fear of being isolated by other members of 
the group.86  Numerous studies have demonstrated the effects that a 
group can have on an individual member’s desire to conform to the 
group.87 
Solomon Asch’s Line Study is illustrative.88  Asch’s experiment 
demonstrates that a high percentage of people, when placed within 
                                                                                                             
make the world safe for democracy[,]” a common war time expression and a phrase often 
used to justify the current War on Terror.   Id.  Sherif cautioned about the dangers of such 
phrases and their power to be used by leaders and other persons to call others into action.  
Id.  See also Lee, 505 U.S. at 592 (discussing the effects of coercion, Justice Kennedy noted, 
“[t]he concern may not be limited to the context of schools, but it is most pronounced 
there[]”); John Valery White, Brown v. Board of Education and the Origins of the Activist 
Insecurity in Civil Rights Law, 28 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 303 (2002) (discussing the legal system’s 
skepticism of psychological data in light of Brown v. Board of Education and the criticism 
directed at the Court for using only sociological data, and no law, to support its decision). 
84 SHERIF, supra note 83, at 85 (noting that in any organized society, norms “serve as focal 
points in the experience of the individual, and subsequently as guides for [the individual’s] 
actions[]”).  Group norms regulate everyday life and people often subconsciously adhere to 
them.  Id.  Norms often form through people’s frames of reference, which serve as the basis 
for people’s stereotypes, customs, and values.  Id.  Once a person has a frame of reference, 
he or she can later adapt this frame of reference based on the new stimuli presented.  Id. 
85 LEON FESTINGER, STANLEY SCHACHTER, & KURT BLACK, SOCIAL PRESSURES IN INFORMAL 
GROUPS:  A STUDY OF HUMAN FACTORS IN HOUSING 72 (Stanford Univ. Press 1950).  This 
book noted that pressures exerted on a group can be overt or hidden, and at times can be 
formalized.  Id. at 101.  Examples of these social pressures are as follows:  people opening 
doors for others, particularly men for women; the way people dress for certain situations; 
and the types of career paths certain people take, such as following the family business.  Id.  
See also GENEVIEVE PAICHELER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SOCIAL INFLUENCE 82 (Cambridge 
Univ. Press 1988) (illustrating the underlying principle of group norms by quoting Hans 
Christian Anderson:  “[t]here were five little peas in a pod, they were green, the pod was 
green, they believed that the entire world was green and for them this was certainly true!”) 
(quotation omitted); Manohar, supra note 76, at 236 (warning that nontransparent 
government messages can potentially indoctrinate the public). 
86 PAICHELER, supra note 85, at 82 (highlighting the impact of majority influences).  
Paicheler pointed out that a person’s decisions are heavily tied to those of the group 
around him.  Id.  “This is true in two respects:  he fears a negative judgment and seeks to 
induce positive evaluations; he relies on others in establishing a point of view that agrees 
with [the rest of the group].”  Id. 
87 See infra notes 88–90.  See generally Alex Geisinger & Ivan E. Bodensteiner, An 
Expressive Jurisprudence of the Establishment Clause, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 77 (2007) (discussing 
the Establishment Clause’s coercion tests, the psychological theory of expressive attitudes, 
and this theory’s effect on people in real situations). 
88 PAICHELER, supra note 85, at 84–90 (discussing the experiment and its findings).  
Another study likely known to people who have completed a basic undergraduate-level 
psychology class is Stanley Milgram’s Shock Experiment, which revealed that people, 
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group settings, are likely to conform to the behaviors and beliefs 
expressed by those around them.89  Most of the subjects in the 
experiment claimed they actually subscribed to the ideas espoused by 
members of the group and gave false answers merely because they did 
not want to express views different than those of their peers.90   Thus, the 
theory of group norms suggests that external messages often lead people 
to change their behaviors in order to conform to the group.91 
From a review of the intricately woven Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence, the following principles emerge:  (1) the governmental 
display containing religious symbols must have a secular purpose; (2) 
the display’s principal or primary effect should not be seen by the 
reasonable observer as endorsing religion; and (3) there should not be an 
excessive entanglement between the government and religion.92  To 
                                                                                                             
when given “suggestions” by an authoritative figure, in this case the experimenter, 
followed these “suggestions[,]” even where doing so caused them to behave contrary to 
accepted social norms.  Id. at 89–90. 
89 Id. at 85.  Asch’s experiment consisted of groups of seven to nine people, and only one 
confederate (i.e., an individual who was “in” on the experiment) was placed in each group.  
Id.  Asch then presented each group with one standard line of a specified length and then 
three comparison lines that varied in length consisting of small, medium, and large.  Id.  
One of the three comparison lines was an exact match to the standard line, and those that 
did not match the standard line were intentionally made to obviously not match.  Id.  The 
confederates gave false responses on seven out of twelve matching attempts, so that Asch 
could assess how the unsuspecting subjects would respond to this perplexing situation.  Id. 
90 Id.  Participants stated that social motivations, and not the desire to be correct, were 
their main concern.  Id.  Other concerns may have been that the collective group could not 
be wrong or that the subject did not want to be different.  Id.  As Asch posited, they became 
“indifferent to the task; they became unconcerned with it, no longer worried about the 
imprecision of their judgments.  Their sole objective was not to stand out, not to deviate.”  
Id.  Asch himself stated, 
A theory of social influences must take into account the pressures 
upon persons to act contrary to their beliefs and values.  They are 
likely to bring to the fore powerful forces that arise from the social 
milieu at the same time that they may reveal forces, perhaps no less 
powerful, that individuals can mobilize to resist coercion and threats 
to their integrity . . . Current thinking has stressed the power of social 
conditions to induce psychological changes arbitrarily.  It has taken 
slavish submission to group forces as the general fact and neglected or 
implicitly denied the capacities of men for independence, for rising 
under certain conditions above group passion and prejudice.  Our 
present task is to observe directly the interaction between individuals 
and groups when the paramount issue is that of remaining 
independent or submitting to social pressure. 
Id. 
91 See supra Part II.A.2.b (discussing the theory of group norms and its application in 
various psychological studies). 
92 See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text (describing the Lemon test and its 
pronged approach).  
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determine whether the governmental display of religious symbols 
violates the aforementioned test, courts consider various elements, 
including the history behind the display, public statements by 
government officials during the legislative process, where the display is 
placed on government property, and what items are included in the 
display.93  Additional considerations underlying a potential 
Establishment Clause violation when a government display contains 
religious symbols are whether government coercion is present and the 
displays affect on group norms.94  
B. Compelled Speech Cases 
The Supreme Court recognizes two doctrines regarding compelled 
speech.95  The first doctrine maintains that the government cannot force a 
person to endorse or express a message with which he disagrees.96  
Wooley v. Maynard97 illustrated this principle.  In Wooley, a New 
Hampshire resident covered up the state’s motto—“Live Free or Die”—
on his license plate because he “refuse[d] to be coerced by the State into 
advertising a slogan which [he found] morally, ethically, religiously, and 
politically abhorrent.”98  The Court held that the New Hampshire 
                                                 
93 See supra note 47 and accompanying text (same as above). 
94 See supra Parts II.A.2.a–b (articulating Justice Kennedy’s psychologically based 
coercion test, Justice Scalia’s opposing physical coercion analysis, and the theory of group 
norms and its greater impact on society’s behaviors). 
95 Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 557 (2005) (discussing the differences 
between compelled subsidies and pure government speech). 
96 Id.  See supra note 74.  This Note does not discuss the precise issues addressed in 
Wooley because Indiana has not made “In God We Trust” its only official license plate.  
However, this Note explores complaints by the public that have asserted that the “In God 
We Trust” license plates have been ‘forced’ on some people by BMV employees, and the 
implicit coercive effects of group norms that could result from such actions by BMV 
employees.  See supra note 74. 
97 430 U.S. 705 (1977).   
98 Id. at 713.  Since 1969, the State of New Hampshire has required that license plates on 
non-commercial vehicles display the State’s motto, “Live Free or Die[.]”  Id. at 707.  Under 
New Hampshire law it was a misdemeanor to knowingly obscure or cover the 
alphanumeric combination on the license plate, including the state motto.  Id.  In 1974, the 
petitioners, devout Jehovah’s Witnesses, began to cover up the state motto on their license 
plate because they found it objectionable.  Id. at 707–08.  During a state court trial, in which 
Mr. Maynard represented himself, the court imposed a twenty-five dollar fine, but 
suspended it in return for good behavior.  Id. at 708.  Mr. Maynard, however, continued to 
object to promoting the state motto on his license plate (by covering up the motto) and after 
a second trial date, was sentenced to fifteen days in county jail.  Id.  See generally West Va. 
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (holding a West Virginia law unconstitutional 
because it compulsorily required students to pledge allegiance to the flag or else face 
expulsion and because it imposed possible criminal sanctions against both students and 
parents).   
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legislature could not constitutionally require its citizens to “display the 
state motto upon their vehicle license plates[]” or face criminal 
sanctions.99 
The second doctrine involves the government compelling citizens to 
subsidize the government’s messages.  In sharp contrast to Wooley, the 
Court in Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n100 rejected claims brought by 
beef growers who challenged a government imposed tax aimed at 
subsidizing the government sponsored promotional campaign—“Beef.  
It’s What’s for Dinner.”101  The Court upheld the tax, reasoning that the 
government may compel subsidization from its citizens for its various 
governmental messages, provided that the government identifies itself as 
the speaker.102  After Johanns, even where the government engages in 
viewpoint discrimination, the government appears to have wide-ranging 
discretion concerning how it subsidizes its own message.103  This is true 
regardless of whether private citizens volunteer to advocate the 
message.104  However, when the government creates and funds a private 
                                                 
99 Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714, 717 (footnote omitted). 
100 544 U.S. 550 (2005). 
101 Id. at 553–55 (discussing the Beef Growers of America, which, funded by various beef 
producers on behalf of the government, produced the familiar advertisements of “Beef. It’s 
What’s for Dinner[]”); ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 385 (6th Cir. 2006) (Boyce, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
102 See generally Johanns, 544 U.S. at 559 (holding that when the government speaks, and is 
sufficiently accountable for its own speech, it can compel the public to subsidize the 
message; in these instances, the government is not subject to First Amendment scrutiny).  
“[C]ompelled support of a private association is fundamentally different from compelled 
support of government.”  Id. (quoting Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 259 n.13 
(1977)).  But cf. United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405 (2001) (holding that the 
government could not compel the mushroom grower, United Foods, to advertise a 
government message when the mushroom grower objected to the speech asserting the 
regulatory purpose was purely advertising and not some broader government regulatory 
scheme). 
103 See Johanns, 544 U.S. at 557. 
104 Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 377-78 (noting that drivers who select the “Choose Life” license 
plate are volunteering to carry forth the government’s message because “they pay out of 
their own pockets for the privilege of putting the government-crafted message on their 
private property[]”).  See also Johanns, 544 U.S. at 559 (discussing the newly defined power 
of the government speech doctrine).  In Johanns, Justice Scalia commented, 
“Compelled support of government”—even those programs of 
government one does not approve—is of course perfectly 
constitutional, as every taxpayer must attest.  And some government 
programs involve, or entirely consist of, advocating a position.  “The 
government, as a general rule, may support valid programs and 
policies by taxes or other exactions binding on protesting parties.  
Within this broader principle it seems inevitable that funds raised by 
the government will be spent for speech and other expression to 
advocate and defend its own polices.” 
Id. 
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forum for speech, it is not permitted to discriminate based on viewpoints 
contained in the message,105 nor is it permitted to compel people to pay 
for the message of a private group.106  Ultimately, the government may 
neither force a private citizen to speak nor compel a citizen to pay for a 
private entity’s message with which he disagrees.107 
Crucial to deciding whether a compelled subsidy is constitutional is 
determining who is speaking and whose message is being advanced.108  
The Supreme Court has decided several cases that have addressed the 
issue of who is speaking and the limits to which the government may 
compel a citizen to subsidize the message.109  However, the Fourth and 
Sixth Circuit’s “Choose Life” license plate cases have specifically dealt 
with speech upon license plates and these cases illustrate the important 
distinction between government and private speech.110  Parts II.B.1–2 
explores these “Choose Life” license plate cases in greater depth.111 
1. Government Speech 
In ACLU of Tennessee v. Bredesen,112 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 
addressed the constitutionality of a Tennessee law that permitted a local 
pro-life organization to create a specialty license plate promoting its 
                                                 
105 See generally Planned Parenthood of S.C., Inc., v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 794–99 (4th Cir. 
2004).  See also United Foods, 533 U.S. at 413–16 (determining that the compelled subsidy for 
the mushroom growers’ advertising campaign was unconstitutional because the speech, by 
itself, was the principal object of the campaign and not as part of some broader regulatory 
scheme). 
106 Abood, 431 U.S. at 259 (holding that the government may not compel subsidies of 
union workers for political campaigns with which the union workers disagreed, but may 
compel the workers to pay for activities related to collective bargaining).  But cf. Glickman 
v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457 (1997) (holding that compelled subsidies for 
agricultural marketing that focused on California fruit growers was constitutional because 
subsidy for the marketing was part of a larger regulatory scheme to promote government 
speech). 
107 See supra notes 96, 105–06 and accompanying text. 
108 ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 385 (6th Cir. 2006) (Boyce, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part).  See W. Va. Ass’n of Club Owners & Fraternal Serv., Inc. v. 
Musgrave, 512 F. Supp. 2d 424, 430–32 (S.D. W.Va. 2007) (noting the constitutional 
importance of determining who is speaking because citizens cannot challenge the funding 
of government speech, but may attack compelled funding of private speech). 
109 See infra Parts II.B.1–2. 
110 See Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 375–80 (upholding the “Choose Life” license plate as 
permissible government speech).  But see Rose, 361 F.3d at 786 (finding South Carolina’s 
“Choose Life” license plates were a mixture of government and private speech and so 
impermissible).  See generally Manohar, supra note 76, at 229–31 (discussing the different 
approaches taken by the Fourth and Sixth Circuits in their analysis of the “Choose Life” 
license plate”). 
111 See infra Parts II.B.1–2. 
112 441 F.3d 370. 
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ideology.113  The ACLU of Tennessee initiated a lawsuit because pro-
choice groups were being denied the ability to create such a plate to 
further their viewpoint.114  In determining whether Tennessee’s “Choose 
Life” license plate was government or private speech, the Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, applying Johanns, held that the State of Tennessee had 
acted within its constitutional limits because the plate constituted 
government speech.115 
The court in Bredesen reasoned that Johanns applied because the State 
of Tennessee, through the statute it enacted, determined and had final 
approval of the message that appeared on the license plate.116  Although 
the court conceded that individuals who chose to display the “Choose 
Life” license plate were engaging in expressive conduct, such actions did 
not create a private forum.117  The government was conveying its own 
message, even if it did not expressly identify itself as the speaker, and 
incidental help the government received from private organizations had 
little relevance.118  The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals referred to Johanns 
                                                 
113 Id. at 371–72. 
114 Id. at 372–73.  The Tennessee legislature enacted into law a statute that permitted the 
creation of the “Choose Life” license plates.  Id. at 372.  During the same legislative session 
that created the “Choose Life” plates, Planned Parenthood attempted to persuade the 
Tennessee legislature to create a “Pro-Choice” license plate as well, but was unsuccessful.  
Id.  The district court relied on the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning in Rose and determined that 
mixed speech was occurring and held that the license plate engaged in viewpoint 
discrimination.  Id. at 372–73.  
115 Id. at 375.  See generally Manohar, supra note 76, at 229 (providing an in-depth 
discussion of the main issues that were presented and the analysis used by the Sixth Circuit 
for its holding in Bredesen). 
116 Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 376–77.  Even though parts of the message were developed by 
New Life, a religious group, the state still maintained the overall veto power to approve or 
deny the message and control the design of the plate.  Id.  The plaintiffs argued that it was 
really “mixed speech” taking place, but the court dismissed this argument.  Id. 
117 Id. at 377.  The court distinguished Tennessee’s “Choose Life” license plates from the 
“Live Free or Die” plates at issue in Wooley because Tennessee motorists were not 
compelled to display the “Choose Life” message, but instead had to purchase the plate as a 
specialty plate.  Id. at 377–78. 
118 Id. at 376–77.  In regard to the first factor, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
noted that it is not implausible that the state would use a specialty license plate program to 
promote its message.  Id. at 376.  This is further evidenced by the fact that Tennessee allows 
many organizations to promote messages while it restricts some organizations from doing 
so.  Id.  The second factor was analogized to Johanns in which the beef promotion messages 
were “outsourced” to another entity but the Secretary of Agriculture still had the final 
approval of the message.  Id. at 377.  The court noted that the third factor, also compared to 
the promotional message in Johanns, determined that any reasonable person would 
attribute a state-issued license plate to the government’s issuing of a message.  Id.  The 
court did note that the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Rose ruled to the contrary.  
Id. at 380.  However, the court dismissed the Fourth Circuit’s ruling because the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Johanns, which was decided after the Fourth Circuit made its decision, 
established a new test that clearly identified the speech in Bredesen as government speech.  
Kulwinski: Trust in God Going Too Far: Indiana's "In God We Trust" License P
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2009
1346 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43 
and also Rust v. Sullivan119 to determine that “[n]o constitutionally 
significant distinction exists between volunteer disseminators and paid 
disseminators.”120 
The dissent suggested that the majority misapplied Johanns in this 
situation because the speech was not compelled.121  Rather than focus on 
the specific “Choose Life” license plate, the dissenting judge explained 
that the license plate program as a whole encouraged private speech, and 
that the state merely provided the medium of exchange.122  The judge 
                                                                                                             
Id.  Also, the court did not think that the Fourth Circuit’s analysis would apply well to this 
case.  Id. 
119 500 U.S. 173 (1991).  Rust involved doctors who worked at a medical clinic that 
received government funds.  Id. at 178.  After issuing government funds to the medical 
clinic, the government prohibited the doctors from discussing abortion or any other related 
topics with their patients.  Id. at 178–82.  The doctors disagreed with this policy and 
challenged it; however, the Court held that when a private entity receives public funds, the 
government has the right to condition receipt of those funds on the fact that that the 
message disseminated is consistent with the government’s wishes.  Id. at 183, 196–200. 
120 Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 378 (comparing the doctors in Rust to the Tennessee “volunteers” 
who put the message on their license plates).  Similar to Rust, the Bredesen court determined 
that if a forum were created, it would force the state to produce messages that run counter 
to its interests.  Id. at 378–79.  But see Manohar, supra note 76, at 230–31 (discussing the 
dangers of permitting the government to speak in deceptive ways).  An interesting 
example of such hidden speech highlighted in the article was that in the years between 
2003 and 2005, “at least twenty federal agencies spent $1.6 billion making and distributing 
[to local television stations] prepackaged news segments[,]” which “praised various 
administration policies ranging from the war in Iraq to fighting computer viruses.”  Id. 
121 Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 380–85 (Boyce, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) 
(discussing that the majority’s decision allows the “government speech doctrine” to 
broadly control and take over the First Amendment analysis).  Judge Boyce pointed to two 
flawed areas in the majority’s reasoning:  the mischaracterization of the specialty license 
plate program and mistaken application of compelled subsides, where nothing was 
compelled.  Id. at 380–81.  Tennessee did not compel citizens to pay for the “Choose Life” 
specialty plate, but instead charged an additional fee to only those people who chose this 
plate.  Id. at 384.  Accordingly, Judge Boyce noted that if the citizens of Tennessee had been 
compelled to subsidize a “Choose Life” message, then it would have been more plausible 
that Johanns apply.  Id. at 387. 
122 Id. at 382–84.  Judge Boyce, concurring in Bredesen, highlighted that Tennessee had 
about 150 license plates available for motorists to choose from and that many of these 
plates had little to do with a government interest.  Id. at 382–83.  Judge Boyce also noted 
that Tennessee promoted its specialty license plate program by offering specialty plates for 
persons who preferred to show their support for their school or community rather than the 
government.  Id. at 384.  Another line of support that favored a finding that Tennessee was 
in reality promoting private speech, not government speech, was that the state required 
1,000 people to preorder the “Choose Life” plates before it began to distribute them.  Id.  
Judge Boyce noted that despite fears expressed by the majority, the Fourth Circuit’s 
holding in Rose had not led to the “doomsday scenario” of organizations like the Ku Klux 
Klan or the Nazi party taking their messages to the state’s license plates.  Id. at 391.  Thus, 
Tennessee could continue to maintain viewpoint neutral regulations as long as it required 
that 1,000 paid orders be placed before the plate is issued.  Id.  However, if a group were 
able to garner the necessary number of signatures, then the state would have to issue the 
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penned the following statement regarding who the First Amendment is 
designed to protect:  “The First Amendment was not written for the vast 
majority of [Tennesseans].  It belongs to a single minority of one.”123  
Despite the dissent’s position, Bredesen’s majority determined that 
Johanns’ reasoning was persuasive and fully applicable to the instant 
case.124  Thus, Tennessee’s “Choose Life” license plate was government 
speech and as such was not susceptible to a compelled subsidy 
challenge.125 
2. A Mixed Bag:  Government and Private Speech  
In contrast to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals in Planned Parenthood of South Carolina v. Rose126 
determined that South Carolina’s “Choose Life” license plates contained 
both government and private speech.127  The law that permitted these 
specialty plates to be distributed to motorists was very detailed, as were 
other specialty plate programs in South Carolina.128  Although Planned 
Parenthood never applied for specialty plates, litigation ensued 
challenging the State of South Carolina on the grounds that the new 
“Choose Life” license plates discriminated based on viewpoint.129  After 
                                                                                                             
plates.  Id.  But, as Judge Boyce noted, no evidence suggested that states had been flooded 
with requests for Ku Klux Klan or other similar plates.  Id. 
123 Id. (alteration in original). 
124 See supra notes 116–20 and accompanying text. 
125 See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
126 361 F.3d 786, 787 (4th Cir. 2004). 
127 Id. at 777.  Cf. Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 391 (Boyce, J., concurring in part, dissenting in 
part). 
128 Rose, 361 F.3d at 788–89 (discussing the specificity of South Carolina’s statute as to 
who could purchase the “Choose Life” plates).  Drivers who wanted the plates not only 
had to pay a fee but also were required to register with the organization that was going to 
receive the funds.  Id. at 788. 
129 Id. at 787–89.  In 2001, South Carolina enacted a statute that authorized the creation of 
a “Choose Life” specialty license plate for purchase by South Carolina drivers.  Id. at 788.  
Each person who purchased one of these license plates was required to pay an additional 
fee beyond the normal cost associated with plate registration.  Id.  Any group that wanted 
to create a specialty plate could do so by meeting certain qualifications and applying to the 
Department of Public Safety (“DPS”), but DPS could deny or modify the plate if it deemed 
it inappropriate or offensive to the greater community.  Id.  Although Planned Parenthood 
never applied to DPS for a specialty plate, Planned Parenthood had lobbied the South 
Carolina legislature to pass a bill creating a “Pro-Choice” plate but was not successful.  Id. 
Interestingly, the general statute for specialty license plates in South Carolina specified that 
a specialty plate was available only to certified members of the respective organization and 
that such a plate could contain only a symbol or emblem of the organization.  Id. at 789.  
However, the statute that created the “Choose Life” plate permitted the phrase “Choose 
Life[,]” clearly more than only a symbol or emblem, to be displayed on the plate, and the 
statute also indicated that the plate was available to anyone who wanted it.  Id.  Even 
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the court determined that Planned Parenthood had standing because 
they had a personal stake in the outcome of the litigation, it addressed 
the First Amendment question regarding whether South Carolina’s 
“Choose Life” plates amounted to government or private speech.130  In 
deciding this question, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals applied a 
four-factor test.131  The test consisted of determining “the central purpose 
of the program in which the speech in question occur[red][,]” the degree 
of editorial control by the speaker, the identity of the actual speaker, and 
the party that bore the ultimate responsibility for the message.132 
Applying this four-factor test, the Rose court found that the purpose 
of the “Choose Life” plate was to promote the State’s preferred pro-life 
viewpoint and that the State had editorial control over the message 
displayed on the plate.133  Reasoning further, the court decided that the 
third and fourth factors cut in favor of private speech because the 
message on a specialty plate is usually identified with the person 
displaying it.134  Ultimately, the court concluded that the message 
                                                                                                             
though Planned Parenthood did not apply for a specialty plate under the general statute, it 
was not required to because it contended that doing so would permit it to display only a 
symbol or emblem of a pro-choice organization, not to display the phrase “Pro-Choice” on 
the plate (like the “Choose Life” plate), thus, still leading to discrimination.  Id. at 791. 
130 Id. at 789–92 (holding that the plaintiffs demonstrated a personal stake in the outcome 
of the litigation, which made the controversy redressable).  If the “In God We Trust” license 
plates are challenged pursuant to the First Amendment compelled subsidy doctrine, 
standing is likely to be a contested issue.  See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at 60–64 
(explaining the basic doctrine of standing and both the constitutional and prudential 
purposes served by the doctrine).  Within the confusing doctrine of standing is the concept 
of generalized grievances and taxpayer standing.  Id. at 90–98.   The Supreme Court has 
held that a taxpayer, in general, does not have standing to litigate a case because he merely 
shares “a general interest common to all members of the public.”  Id. at 92.  However, one 
exception recognized by the Court, though subsequently narrowed, was in Flast v. Cohen, 
392 U.S. 83 (1968).  Id.  Flast established a two-prong test to allow petitioners to achieve 
taxpayer standing in a case in which the government had allegedly violated the 
Establishment Clause by subsidizing various religious institutions.  Id. at 92–93.  See 
generally Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (holding that a Texas tax 
exemption offered to individuals who purchased certain religious publications that were 
used primarily for teaching religious texts was unconstitutional for violating the 
Establishment Clause because it was too narrowly written, provided benefits only for 
religious purposes, and lacked a secular purpose). 
131 Rose, 361 F.3d at 792–93. 
132 Id.  The Rose court applied the test from Sons of Confederate Veterans and found that the 
license plates consisted of private speech.  Id. at 793. 
133 Id. at 793–94.  The court noted that, unlike the “Choose Life” license plate in Sons of 
Confederate Veterans, this “Choose Life” license plate was developed through the legislative 
process and signed into law by the Governor.  Id. at 793.  The plate in Sons of Confederate 
Veterans had originated with the state, and the state had determined that the plate would 
read “Choose Life.”  Id. 
134 Id. at 793–94.  The Rose court relied on Wooley for the proposition that “even messages 
on standard license plates are associated at least partly with the vehicle owners.”  Id. at 794.  
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contained on a specialty license plate is both government and private 
speech, and, thus, applying a bright-line rule would oversimplify the 
situation.135  The Rose court, explaining that license plates contain mixed 
speech, referenced Wooley and noted that the association between the 
message displayed on the plate and the vehicle owner is even stronger 
when a specialty plate is at issue.136 
The Rose court then held that South Carolina had engaged in 
viewpoint discrimination because it permitted a pro-life message but 
denied a pro-choice message.137  The court explained that allowing the 
pro-life message to dominate the forum could mislead people to believe 
that most South Carolinians adopt a pro-life position.138  This rationale 
parallels what the Supreme Court has cautioned against in the 
Establishment Clause context, specifically that “[e]ndorsement sends a 
message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the 
political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that 
they are insiders, favored members of the political community.”139 
Although the Rose court briefly acknowledged that the speech 
implicated the government because the legislature enacted the specialty 
license plate program, it dismissed this argument as shortsighted for 
failing to recognize the unique nature of specialty license plates.140  When 
                                                                                                             
The court noted that this association is strengthened when the vehicle owner displays a 
specialty license plate.  Id.  As the Rose court pointed out, a person who sees someone with 
a “Choose Life” license plate would correctly assume that the person holds a pro-life view.  
Id.  The court analogized the situation to that of a bumper sticker identifying the message 
of its owner and not that of its manufacturer.  Id.  The court concluded, unlike its holding in 
Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., that such speech is not completely private speech, but 
rather it contains both government and private speech.  Id.  See also ACLU of Tenn. v. 
Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 386 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Thomas Jefferson who once said, “‘To 
compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he 
disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical[]’”). 
135 Rose, 361 F.3d at 794. 
136 Id.; see also Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 557 (2005) (in referencing 
Wooley, the court noted that “[o]bliging people to ‘use their private property as a ‘mobile 
billboard’ for the State’s ideological message’ amounted to impermissible compelled 
expression[]”) 
137 Rose, 361 F.3d at 794. 
138 Id. at 798.  See also Manohar, supra note 76, at 234–36.  Manohar highlighted two major 
concerns with allowing the government to hide behind private volunteers.  The first 
concern is that it enables  the government to dominate the marketplace of ideas without the 
visible check of the political process.  Id. at 234.  The second concern is that it enables the 
government to indoctrinate the minds of both the messengers and receivers of the message; 
the more force the government has in controlling the market, the less ability the private 
individual has to counter this force.  Id. 
139 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)   
140 Rose, 361 F.3d at 798–99.  See also Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, No. 04 C 4316, 2007 WL 
178455, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Jan 19, 2007), rev’d, 547 F.3d 853 (7th Cir. 2008).  Recently, in Choose 
Life Ill., Inc. v. White, the Northern District of Illinois adopted the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning 
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license plates promote a wide array of messages, the identity of the 
government as speaker is often obscured.141  After Johanns, determining 
the speaker is critical to the outcome of the litigation because who is 
speaking—the government or a private individual—determines whether 
the subsidization of the speech is exempt from First Amendment 
analysis.142 
III.  ANALYSIS 
An idiosyncrasy triggered by Indiana’s “In God We Trust” license 
plates is the issue of who is speaking—the government or the private 
individual.  Not only is the identification of the speaker essential to the 
outcome in compelled subsidy challenges,143 but also the distinction is 
important in the Establishment Clause context as well.144  Indiana would 
likely contend that “In God We Trust” is government speech to avoid a 
compelled subsidy claim, and it would also likely claim “In God We 
Trust” to be patriotic to avoid Establishment Clause concerns.  However, 
if “In God We Trust” is classified as religious, then Indiana may claim 
the plate to be private speech, in an attempt to distance itself from the 
phrase and overcome an Establishment Clause challenge.145  Part III 
analyzes this dichotomy of Establishment Clause jurisprudence and 
                                                                                                             
from Rose and held that specialty license plates constitute private speech, especially 
because the specialty plates at issue were initiated by a private organization that 
maintained considerable editorial control over them.  Id..  The Northern District of Illinois 
Court, much like the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Rose, recognized that 
license plates contain aspects of government speech.  Id. at *6.  Yet, when a private 
individual, who has paid for a plate that carries a particular message, displays the plate, it 
becomes private speech.  Id.  But see Choose Life Ill., Inc., 547 F.3d at 855-56 (The Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Northern District of Illinois, however, concluding 
that Illinois had engaged in permissible content regulation because it did not permit any 
specialty license plates dealing with the subject of abortion, regardless of viewpoint).  Yet, 
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the district court’s finding that license 
plates, particularly specialty ones, are a mixture of government and private speech and that 
after Johanns, the four-factor test from Rose remains the best mode of analysis to determine 
who is speaking.  Id. at 859–64.  
141 Rose, 361 F.3d at 798–99. 
142 See Manohar, supra note 76, at 229 (highlighting the constitutional importance of 
defining who is speaking—the government or a private entity—in determining whether the 
law in question is valid). 
143 See supra Part II.B. 
144 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 302 (2000).  The Supreme Court held 
that students’ self-initiated prayers before high school football games, which were 
permitted by the school district, violated the Establishment Clause.  Id.  The Court 
concluded, “there is a crucial difference between government speech endorsing religion, 
which the Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which the 
Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect.”  Id. at 302. 
145 See infra Parts III.A–B. 
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compelled subsidy doctrines as applied to Indiana’s “In God We Trust” 
license plates, which, in the end, will likely determine the 
constitutionality of the plates.146 
A. Applying the Establishment Clause:  Context, Purpose, and Coercion 
The current state of Establishment Clause jurisprudence often leaves 
courts confused as to how to apply the various doctrines to the issues 
presented.147  In fact, the Supreme Court in McCreary summarized this 
confusion as follows: 
 [I]t has been clear that Establishment Clause 
doctrine lacks the comfort of categorical absolutes.  In 
special instances we have found good reason to hold 
governmental action legitimate even where its manifest 
purpose was presumably religious.  No such reasons 
present themselves here.148 
Indeed, challenges to the Establishment Clause are often highly fact 
specific as courts examine many variables.149  At times, the Establishment 
Clause’s lack of definitional precision resembles the Court’s imprecise 
obscenity or pornography jurisprudence, where Justice Stewart 
acknowledged the Court was “trying to define what may be 
indefinable[,]” but that he knew a violation when he saw it; perhaps in 
this case, despite a clear standard, a reasonable observer knows when an 
entity endorses religion.150  Part III.A highlights analytical gaps in the 
Court’s current Establishment Clause jurisprudence with regard to 
examining the context, purpose, and coercive effects of Indiana’s “In 
God We Trust” plates.151 
1. Revealing Context and Purpose 
Applying Establishment Clause jurisprudence to Indiana’s “In God 
We Trust” license plates presents an interesting conflict because of the 
                                                 
146 See infra Parts III.A–B. 
147 See supra Part II.A.1. 
148 McCreary Cty., Ky., v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860 n.10 (2005) (citation omitted). 
149 Id. at 891–93 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (highlighting the various areas in which the Court 
has upheld laws that seemed to favor religion). 
150 See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (noting Justice 
Stewart’s oft-quoted statement “I know it when I see it[]” (“it” referring to obscenity),  
made in reference to an obscene motion picture that was exhibited to an audience in 
violation of Ohio law).  
151 See infra Parts III.A.1–2. 
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phrase used on the plates and the public discourse surrounding the 
adoption of the plates.152  In analyzing cases involving governmental 
displays of religious symbols, the Court has focused on history and 
context and has suggested that history and context often reveal the true 
purpose behind a display of religious symbols.153  Since its adoption, the 
national motto—“In God We Trust”—has survived legal challenges, and 
indeed, the use of the motto by itself would not likely violate the 
Establishment Clause.154  However, having placed the motto “In God We 
Trust” on Indiana’s license plates, Indiana has taken the phrase to a 
whole new medium and context that lacks the long history and common 
usage that has purportedly absolved the phrase of any religious 
connotation.155 
                                                 
152 See infra notes 153–80 and accompanying text. 
153 See Schaps, supra note 67, at 1256–57 (stating that the Court must consider the past 
actions in their entirety because “purpose matters[]”’).  Justice Breyer holds this view—that 
context and the historical development of the item in question matters.  Id. at 1258–60. 
154 See ACLU of Ohio v. Capitol Square Rev. & Advisory Bd., 243 F.3d 289, 301 (6th Cir. 
2001) (noting that at least three other circuits have upheld the national motto, “In God We 
Trust[,]” as constitutional under alleged Establishment Clause violations).  The Sixth 
Circuit acknowledged that the Supreme Court has never questioned the motto against its 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, but that the motto would likely withstand any 
potential attack regarding its validity.  Id.; see also Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh 
Ch., 492 U.S. 573, 602–03 (1989) (stating that the national motto and the pledge of allegiance 
have been considered in dicta of Supreme Court decisions and found to be ceremonial 
deism).  See generally ACLU of Ohio v. Capitol Sq. Rev. & Advis. Board, 210 F.3d 703, 720–
22 (6th Cir. 2000) (highlighting that the motto is ceremonial deism protected from the 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence because it has lost its religious message).  In ACLU of 
Ohio, the Sixth Circuit noted two decisions from the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, which found 
that the national motto does not offend the Constitution and would not, by itself, endorse 
religion to a reasonable observer.  Id. at 721–22.  See also supra note 134 (this Note is not 
arguing that the national motto itself violates the Establishment Clause, but rather that its 
usage in this new context, on a license plate, violates the Establishment Clause, especially 
when viewed in light of surrounding evidence).  Similarly, “In God We Trust” displayed 
on a license plate contains an attribution problem due to the complexities of whether this is 
a private statement or endorsement from the government.  Supra note 134.   See generally 
ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 377 (6th Cir. 2006).  Yet, license plates are 
government property and issued by the government, and thus they still can be identified 
with the government promoting this message, especially when it is the legislature that 
enacted this bill and chose to single it out as a cost-free alternative.  Id. 
155 See supra notes 64–67 (discussing how the long history, tradition, and context of the 
monuments in Van Orden were important to upholding their validity, and how Justice 
Breyer, who provided the concurring vote in Van Orden, found these elements especially 
important to finding the monuments constitutional).  See also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 
597 (1992) (noting that Establishment Clause cases are highly fact sensitive).  See Allegheny, 
492 U.S. at 603.  Although “there is an obvious distinction between crèche displays and 
references to God in the [national] motto and the pledge[,] . . . [and] history may affect the 
constitutionality of nonsectarian references to religion by the government, history cannot 
legitim[iz]e practices that demonstrate the government’s allegiance to a particular sect or 
creed.”  Id. (footnote omitted).  The Court continued: 
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The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Indiana Civil Liberties Union 
v. O’Bannon156 reiterated that context matters when determining whether 
a religious symbol (or phrase) displayed by the state violates the 
Establishment Clause.157  Furthermore, the size of the text on a display 
may shed light on the display’s purpose and may affect the 
determination of whether the display is constitutional.158  As the United 
States Supreme Court has noted, it must be determined whether the 
display is merely passive in its use or actively confronts the passersby.159  
With regard to Indiana’s “In God We Trust” license plates, the “In God 
We Trust” language is placed on Indiana’s state-issued license plates that 
many motorists see regularly.160  The words on the Indiana license plates, 
                                                                                                             
Indeed, in Marsh itself, the Court recognized that not even the “unique 
history” of legislative prayer can justify contemporary legislative 
prayers that have the effect of affiliating the government with any one 
specific faith or belief.  The legislative prayers involved in Marsh did 
not violate this principle because the particular chaplain had “removed 
all references to Christ.”  Thus, Marsh plainly does not stand for the 
sweeping proposition . . . that all accepted practices 200 years old and 
their equivalents are constitutional today.  Nor can Marsh, given its 
facts and its reasoning, compel the conclusion that the display of the 
crèche involved in this lawsuit is constitutional. . . .  
The history of this Nation, it is perhaps sad to say, contains numerous 
examples of official acts that endorsed Christianity 
specifically. . . . Whatever else the Establishment Clause may 
mean . . . it certainly means at the very least that government may not 
demonstrate a preference for one particular sect or creed (including a 
preference for Christianity over other religions). 
Id. at 603–04 (citations omitted).  
156 259 F.3d 766 (7th Cir. 2001). 
157 Id. at 778.  The original Ten Commandments display was erected in the 1950s and 
resembled the monument in Van Orden; this original monument was destroyed in 1991, 
and it was the replacement monument that was at issue in this litigation.  Id. at 768.  The 
court described in detail the visual make-up of the monument and noted that the 
monument also contained other documents like the state constitution and Bill of Rights.  Id.  
at 769.  The monument was placed on the statehouse grounds among several other 
monuments recognizing things such as Indiana women, civil engineers, and Civil War 
history.  Id.  As the 1991 monument significantly differed from the original display, the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the purpose behind the original display 
would not transfer to the 1991 version.  Id. at 771.  The court determined that, contextually, 
nothing appeared to detract from the monument’s religious message because there was no 
unifying theme linking the other displays.  Id. at 773. 
158 Id. at 772–73.  The Seventh Circuit closely scrutinized the size of the text on the Ten 
Commandments monument, which was one inch larger than the other documents on the 
display, and noted that it was highly visible to a passerby and that it drew attention to its 
religious message, leading to its unconstitutional fate.  Id. 
159 See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
160 See Bureau of Motor Vehicles Website, http://www.in.gov/bmv/4645.htm (last 
visited Feb. 8, 2009) (displaying the “In God We Trust” license plate for a visual look at the 
design of the Indiana “In God We Trust” plate).  Cf. Plateshack, 
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particularly “God” and “Trust[,]” occupy a prominent position.161  
Moreover, unlike the situation in Van Orden, in which the monument of 
the Ten Commandments was surrounded by several other secular 
monuments representing the state’s diverse history, the message on 
Indiana’s “In God We Trust” license plate is not surrounded by 
numerous other secular items, displays, or messages that detract from 
the potentially religious message on the license plate.  Moreover, the 
plate does not contain any explanation that “In God We Trust” is the 
national motto.162 
When the phrase “In God We Trust” is considered in conjunction 
with the history and purpose surrounding the enactment of the “In God 
We Trust” plates in Indiana, the constitutionality of these plates becomes 
even less clear.163  The Court’s recent decision in McCreary appears to 
revive Lemon’s focus on the purpose behind the display, thereby 
designating purpose as a critical factor in assessing governmental 
displays of religious messages.164  The McCreary court emphasized that 
                                                                                                             
http://www.plateshack.com/y2k/Tennessee/tn2007eagle.jpg (last visited Nov. 10, 2007) 
(showing Tennessee’s plate with “In God We Trust” on it).  A portion of the money 
collected from people purchasing the Bald Eagle specialty license plate went to a 
foundation that raises money for protection of the bald eagle.  Id.  See 
http://www.eagles.org/ for more information. 
161 See supra note 160.  Compare Bureau of Motor Vehicles Website, 
http://www.in.gov/bmv/4645.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2009) (displaying a picture of 
Indiana’s “In God We Trust” license plate, pictured below, to show the font size of “God” 
and “Trust” in the “In God We Trust” motto), with The Pew Forum on Religion and Public 
Life, http://pewforum.org/assets/images/in-god-we-trust_large.jpg (last visited Feb. 8, 
2009) (displaying a picture of the back of a twenty dollar bill, pictured below, to show the 
uniformity of the font of all of the words in the “In God We Trust” motto). 
        
162 See ACLU Neb. Foundation v. City of Plattsmouth, 419 F.3d 772, 778–81 (8th Cir. 
2005), rev’g en banc, 358 F.3d 1020 (8th Cir. 2004) (Bye & Arnold, JJ., dissenting) (discussing 
that an Establishment Clause challenge should not be decided based on a simple passage of 
time, mathematical formula, or a basic consideration of history and tradition). 
163 See infra notes 164–80. 
164 See supra note 60 and accompanying text.  See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at 1202 
(noting that in Van Orden the Court used the symbolic endorsement test to uphold the 
monument display, while in McCreary the Court used the Lemon test to strike down the 
monument display).  Justice Souter defended the purpose prong of Lemon, despite its harsh 
critics on the Court, when he stressed that the prong was the very foundation of 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence.  Id. at 1203; see also Schaps, supra note 67, at 1249 
(noting that the decision by the Court in McCreary relied heavily on the purpose prong of 
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courts must investigate “readily discoverable fact[s],” including the 
legislative history of the display, the sequence of events leading up to the 
enactment of the display, and comments made by the sponsor of the 
display.165  Moreover, the reasonable observer need not “turn a blind eye 
                                                                                                             
Lemon).  See generally McCreary Cty., Ky. v. ACLU., 545 U.S. 844, 886–93 (2005) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (when deciding Establishment Clause cases, Justice Scalia often relies on, as he 
did in Van Orden, the history and tradition of the Founding Fathers to validate the 
challenged practice, whether it is legislative prayer or governmental displays).  In 
McCreary, in support of an accommodationist position, Justice Scalia noted that when the 
Founding Fathers referenced God or the Creator, they presumably spoke of a monotheistic 
God.  Id. at 894.  Justice Scalia has also often suggested that some members of the Court 
desire to take religion out of the public sphere altogether, but he recanted this in a story he 
told while in Europe the day after the September 11, 2001 attacks.  Id. at 885.  He noted that 
a European judge commented to him after hearing President Bush’s television address to 
the nation, in which the President ended by saying “God bless America,” that the judge 
wished his head of state could espouse similar sentiments during a national tragedy, but 
was forbidden from doing so because of the strict separation of church and state in many 
Western European countries.  Id. at 885–86.  But see supra note 19 (referring to Justice 
Brennan’s quote in Abington Sch. Dist).  While Justice Scalia’s positions on the 
Establishment Clause are reasonable and may very well be the case, Justice Brennan aptly 
articulated that the diverse mix of religions and irreligion in this country was not likely 
considered in 1787.  supra note 19.  Although a strict separation approach may alleviate 
some of the confusing decisions handed down by the Supreme Court because it would 
provide a clearer approach—similar to Justice Scalia’s neutral law of general applicability 
approach to the Free Exercise clause in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)—
this Note is not suggesting that any public, governmental reference to God must be 
stricken.  This Note merely suggests that the muddled jurisprudence of the Court has quite 
possibly permitted Indiana to find a loophole in the Court’s reasoning by permitting 
suspicious motivations because of perceived legitimate methods. 
165 McCreary, 545 U.S. at 862–63.  As the Court noted, “A secret motive stirs up no strife 
and does nothing to make outsiders of nonadherents, and it suffices to wait and see 
whether such government action turns out to have (as it may even be likely to have) the 
illegitimate effect of advancing religion.”  Id. at 863.  If an objective observer, aware of the 
history and other events surrounding the enactment of the display, did not perceive a 
religious message, then the endorsing concern is essentially eliminated.  Id.; see also ACLU 
v. Rowan Cty., 513 F. Supp. 2d 889, 902 (E.D. Ky. 2007) (noting other considerations that a 
court can evaluate when deciphering the purpose behind the governmental display).  But 
see McCreary, 545 U.S. at 900–03 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing strongly the majority in 
McCreary for exploring the purpose and the legislative history behind a challenged law). In 
McCreary, Justice Scalia noted that the majority manipulated Lemon’s basic requirements to 
fit the outcome they desired.  Id. at 900.  Justice Scalia questioned the majority’s use of the 
reasonable observer and wondered why a law could be found unconstitutional because of 
what a reasonable person would think of a display even though the display could have a 
purely secular purpose.  Id. at 900–01.  Furthermore, Justice Scalia inquired about the 
Court’s shifting demands for the secular purpose when reviewing a challenged display 
claiming, “the Court replaces Lemon’s requirement that the government have ‘a 
secular . . . purpose,’ with the heightened requirement that the secular purpose 
‘predominate’ over any purpose to advance religion.”  Id. at 901–02 (citations omitted).  See 
also Antony Barone Kolenc, “Mr. Scalia’s Neighborhood”:  A Home for Minority Religions?, 81 
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 819, 819–21 (2007) (discussing Justice Scalia’s interpretation of the 
Establishment Clause and his influence over the Court).  The article noted that, if given the 
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to the context in which [a] . . . [display] arose.”166  The McCreary Court 
noted that, although a display could violate Lemon’s purpose prong 
because its history manifests a sectarian purpose, another display—
similar in content, but lacking such historical sectarian purpose—could 
be deemed constitutional.167  “[I]t is appropriate that [displays] be 
treated differently, for . . . one display . . . [may] be properly understood 
as demonstrating a preference for one group of religious believers as 
against another.”168  Such is indeed the case with Indiana’s “In God We 
Trust” plates. 
The statements Representative Burton made regarding the “In God 
We Trust” plates, and the context in which he made them, strongly 
suggest that his intent was to promote religion.169  According to the 
Indiana House of Representatives-Republican Caucus, Representative 
Burton stated, 
“We put this bill forward so that our citizens could 
express their belief regardless of their religious 
background[.]” . . . “This license plate reflects Hoosiers' 
faith and values[] . . . . Because this is non-
denominational, Hoosiers will pay for the cost to 
                                                                                                             
chance, Justice Scalia would likely replace the Lemon test with the actual coercion test.  Id. at 
831–35.  However, the Court in McCreary highlighted various decisions where the Court 
did require a heightened secular purpose.  McCreary, 545 U.S. at 859–60 n.9.   
166 McCreary, 545 U.S. at 866. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. at 866 n.14.   
169 See H.B. 1029, 114th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2005) (proposing “In God We Trust” 
license plates for Indiana motorists); see also H.B. 1013, 114th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 
2006) (proposing the current version of the “In God We Trust” license plates); H.B. 1189, 
114th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2005) (proposing an “In God We Trust” sticker to be 
placed on license plates for a fee of twenty-five dollars); H.B. 1279, 113th Gen. Assem., Reg. 
Sess. (Ind. 2003) (proposing an “In God We Trust” license plate that the legislature did not 
ultimately authorize).  See Hoosier Values at the Statehouse, Vol. 1 Issue 1 (May 9, 2006) 
(noting that various faith-based groups have been working on the design for the “In God 
We Trust” license plate).  The article emphasized faith and values for Indiana residents and 
appeared alongside other faith-based topics.  Id.  Governor Daniels, referring to the “In 
God We Trust” plates, stated, “Our Constitution restricts the establishment of religion, it 
does not require the absence of it.”  Id.  See Huffstutter, supra note 11, at 14 (noting that 
originally there was contention as to what the funds recovered from the “In God We Trust” 
license plates would be used for, whether these funds would go to religious groups, and 
whether the license plates violated the Establishment Clause; thus, Representative Burton 
must have strategically avoided these issues by categorizing the plates as standard plates 
rather than specialty plates).  An interesting question is that if these plates are purely 
intended to promote our national heritage, then why should there be any discussion or fear 
on the part of Representative Burton as to where the funds would go?  See Bradner, supra 
note 74, at A3 (perhaps one State Representative wondered this as well when he voted “no” 
to the license plate because he felt it “pander[ed] to the religious[]”). 
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produce the plate and there will be no money going to 
any specific organization. . . . As our new Governor 
said[,] ‘we are a state of people who speak plainly,’ 
that’s what those who purchase this plate are doing.’170 
Similar comments were made in McCreary by a pastor, who 
accompanied one of his parishioners, the Judge-Executive, at the 
courthouse ceremony where the Ten Commandments were unveiled.171  
The pastor stated that the Ten Commandments represented a “creed of 
ethics[,]” and that displaying them was “one of the greatest things the 
judge could have done to close out the millennium.”172  Even though 
various members of the Court have made conflicting statements 
regarding the precise standard required by Lemon’s purpose prong, the 
majority in McCreary explained that the secular purpose of a display 
must be both sincere and genuine.173  Both the legislative history and the 
                                                 
170 See Indiana House of Representative-Republican Caucus, http://www.in.gov/ 
legislative/house_republicans/thisweek/index050121.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2007).  
Representative Burton also claimed that, “[w]ith this proposal, there is no fiscal impact to 
the state.  If the bill makes it out of the Indiana Senate and approved by the Governor, it 
will be available for purchase beginning January 1, 2006.  Any license holder may apply to 
purchase the ‘In God We Trust’ plate.”  Id.   
171 McCreary, 545 U.S. at 851 (noting that the county legislative body issued an order 
“requiring the display [to] be posted in a very high traffic area of the courthouse[]”) 
(alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted). 
172 McCreary, 545 U.S. at 851.  See also supra note 38 (discussing the display of a picture of 
Representative Burton presenting a ceremonial license plate to his pastor at a ceremony 
marking the distribution of the new license plate).  This appears similar to the hanging 
ceremony of the Ten Commandments display that was at issue in McCreary.  545 U.S. at 
851. 
173 See supra note 60 and accompanying text.  See Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches 
Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398–99 (1993) (Scalia and Thomas, J.J., concurring) 
(Justice Scalia, a vocal critic of the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence, has led a 
spirited crusade to abandon Lemon’s three-pronged test).  Justice Scalia’s disgust for the 
Lemon test was humorously captured when he wrote: 
Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in 
its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried, 
Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again[] . . .  
[t]he secret of the Lemon test’s survival, I think, is that it is so easy to 
kill.  It is there to scare us (and our audience) when we wish to do so, 
but we can command it to return to the tomb at will. 
Id. at 398–99.  Lamb’s Chapel involved a school district that had denied a local evangelical 
church the ability to use school facilities after normal hours to show a series of films, which 
focused on child rearing and Christian values.  Id. at 387–89.  The Court held that the school 
district’s actions violated the public forum doctrine, and permitting the films to be shown 
did not violate the Establishment Clause, nor did it offend Lemon’s three-part test.  Id. at 
390–95.  Justice Scalia’s concurrence criticized the Court’s invocation of the Lemon test as 
misguided.  Id. at 399–400 (stating, “I will decline to apply Lemon—whether it validates or 
invalidates the government action in question . . . .”).  Justice Scalia is a strong advocate for 
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purpose behind the enactment of a display must be considered when 
assessing the actual effect of the display.174  Said differently, a 
theoretically legitimate end should not be accomplished by 
impermissible means; therefore, it is not only important to consider the 
display itself, but also the content and history of the display.175 
Similarly, under Justice O’Connor’s modified Lemon test, sometimes 
referred to as the Endorsement test, a reasonable observer in Indiana 
might regard Indiana’s “In God We Trust” license plates as carrying a 
religious message, not merely the national motto.176  Significantly, as the 
Court in McCreary explained, “reasonable observers have reasonable 
memories,” and a reasonable Indiana citizen is unlikely to forget the 
controversy surrounding the purpose of a particular governmental 
display.177  Indeed, the reaction by the public to the religious overtones 
of Indiana’s “In God We Trust” license plates is evidenced in the 
numerous newspaper and internet-based articles and commentary 
accompanying these articles.178  For instance, one person who purchased 
                                                                                                             
abandoning the Lemon test in Establishment Clause challenges due to its unmanageable 
standards and inconsistent application.  See id. 
174 See supra Parts III.A.1, IV.A (discussing Justice Breyer’s approach in Van Orden).   
175 See supra Part III (referring to McCreary and the county’s efforts to find a secular 
purpose for the Ten Commandment’s display through its continual transformations). 
176 See supra note 10; see also Taking Down Words: In God We Trust: New License Plates 
Are As Popular As Predicted Last Year, http://www.takingdownwords.com/ 
taking_down_words/2007/01/in_god_we_trust.html#comment-27442014 (last visited 
Nov. 10, 2007) (posting comments on a blog that highlight the reaction by the public to 
these plates; most see it as making a religious statement). 
177 McCreary, 545 U.S. at 866 (noting that “[its] precedents sensibly forbid an observer ‘to 
turn a blind eye to the context in which [the] policy arose[]’”) (second alteration in 
original).  Moreover, the Court emphasized that “purpose matters[]” and that “it will 
matter to objective observers whether posting the Commandments follows on the heels of 
displays motivated by sectarianism, or whether [the display] lacks a history demonstrating 
that purpose.”  Id. at 866 n.14.   
178 See generally Northwest Indiana Times: ‘In God We Trust’ Motto Still Causes Debate, 
http://www.nwitimes.com/articles/2007/10/01/news/top_news/docb2b32b03ca4d304f8
6257366007e1c1d.txt (last visited Nov. 10, 2007) (posting numerous comments by local 
citizens which revealed the overwhelming religious sentiments and reactions to the use of 
the motto on Indiana’s plates).  The following comments were taken from people posting 
remarks on the website after the article was published: “Plain and Simple.  People of ALL 
faiths should be respected, and should those with no faith.  The government must be here 
to help and service all of us, not just a certain group.  In doing so, they must remail [sic] 
NEUTRAL on religious belives [sic] and not support anyone belief system.”  Id.  While 
another person said, “Hey, if you donnn’t [sic] like the phrase ‘In GOD We Trust’ on your 
license plate, buy a vanity plate.  I personally trust in God[,]” and another person titled 
“More Christians than you think” wrote, “I believe in God but was disappointed when I 
renewed my registration online and was NOT given the option of obtaining one of these 
plates.  So, there would be a lot more of these plates riding around.  Do any of the gang 
members have these plates?”  Id. 
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an “In God We Trust” license plate stated, “You know, I just like the idea 
of going with one that talks about God[] . . . .  Besides, it’s cheaper [than 
a specialty license plate] and that’s what really sells me on it.”179  Yet, as 
the Court in Allegheny suggested, the government may not favor any 
religion over irreligion, even a monotheistic, non-denominational 
religion.180 
2. Coercion:  Safety in Numbers? 
As Indiana’s “In God We Trust” license plates become more 
common, public acceptance of the plate gains strength.181  To be sure, 
although Indiana motorists are not being forced into choosing the “In 
God We Trust” license plate, implicit coercion may be more likely to 
occur as the plates become more popular.182  The proliferation of “In God 
We Trust” plates may leave certain segments of society feeling as though 
they are outsiders and not part of the popular group.183  Further, some 
anecdotal evidence shows that Bureau of Motor Vehicle (“BMV”) 
employees, at least initially, suggestively favored the “In God We Trust” 
license plate over the standard plate to its customers.184  This would have 
resulted in some individuals, who were visiting the BMV to receive their 
new license plates, being forced to speak by disclosing their opposition 
to the plate’s message to the BMV employees, thereby casting themselves 
as outsiders and not within the favored group.185 
                                                 
179 Huffstutter, supra note 11, at 14. 
180 Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Ch., 492 U.S. 573, 593–97 (1989).  The 
government cannot promote or support religious messages by religious organizations 
either.  Id. at 600.  See supra notes 176–79 (Thus, the use of “In God We Trust” on Indiana’s 
license plates could at the very least be viewed as promoting religion in general, even if a 
particular God is not explicitly named).   
181 See Inside Indiana Business, http://www.insideindianabusiness.com/newsitem.asp? 
ID=24744 (last visited Nov. 10, 2007) (noting that more than one million “In God We Trust” 
license plates have filled Indiana roadways).  Representative Burton stated, “I am proud 
that the people of Indiana are standing up for our nation’s motto and choosing the ‘In God 
We Trust’ license plate[] . . . .  Even though some people are challenging the word ‘special’ 
surrounding the alternative license plate, the only thing that is truly special about this plate 
is that people want to display it.”  Id.  See supra notes 12-14 (discussing the mixed messages 
as to whether the Indiana “In God We Trust” plate is a specialty plate or an alternative 
regular plate).  
182 See supra note 181. 
183 See Furthermore, supra note 6, at 12A (asking if drivers are beginning to “wonder if you 
might be the last driver without an ‘In God We Trust’ license plate?”).   
184 See Brander, supra note 74, at A3 (noting that there have been confirmed allegations 
that some BMV employees have pushed the plates upon motorists). 
185 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (recognizing that the First Amendment 
“includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all[]”). 
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Similarly, various psychological studies show that dissemination by 
the government of a perceived religious message can change the 
attitudes of people.186  However, even Solomon Asch, the experimenter 
who conducted the line studies, recognized that the theory of group 
norms has its limits.187  It is true that Indiana citizens can express their 
displeasure with the “In God We Trust” license plates in a variety of 
ways, which could counter the effect that a perceived group adherence 
may have.188  But this situation necessarily forces citizens to speak, which 
violates the principle established in Wooley that inherent in the First 
Amendment is “the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from 
speaking at all.”189  Just as the Court has cautioned against disseminating 
a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, the court should also 
acknowledge the powerful psychological impact of group norms and the 
desire by individuals to adhere to a collective message.190 
B. An Analytical Reflection:  A Taxing Approach 
Throughout their history, license plates were used merely to identify 
the cars with their owners.191  Today, the license plate has moved well 
beyond the simple alphanumeric combination on a plain-colored 
background toward a mobile billboard of sorts that carries a message for 
                                                 
186 Manohar, supra note 76, at 236 (listing three cues that the government can use to better 
effectuate its message).  One of the cues mentioned deals with pure numbers noting that 
“[t]he government can increase the persuasiveness of its speech by enlisting multiple, 
ostensibly independent agents . . . to send its message.”  Id.  Another cue that is present in 
Indiana’s situation is popularity because “[i]f the government uses private speakers to 
make its message seem more popular than it actually is . . . it can increase the 
persuasiveness of that message.”  Id. 
187 PAICHELER, supra note 85, at 88.   
188 Manohar, supra note 76, at 235 (noting that drivers could place bumper stickers on 
their cars or utilize other means to display their opposition, thus keeping the public 
discourse open to their ideas).  Likewise, Indiana motorists can let their voice be heard 
through editorial columns, as some have done, or by not choosing the plate altogether.  See 
generally id.  
189 Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714.   
190 See supra notes 181–89.  See also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at 1226–27 (discussing the 
government’s interactions with religion and the premise of ceremonial deism).  
Chemerinsky pointed to the factors highlighted by Justice O’Connor that would guide 
courts as to whether government interactions would be deemed ceremonial deism or a 
violation of the Establishment Clause.  Id. 
191 See Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles, http://www.in.gov/bmv/vote/history/ (last 
visited Nov. 10, 2007) (discussing the history of Indiana license plates with illustrative 
pictures showing the progression of the design of the “In God We Trust” plate).  Cf. 
Massachusetts RMV Website, http://www.mass.gov/rmv/history/index.htm (last visited 
Nov. 10, 2007) (discussing the history of license plates in general and, specifically, in 
Massachusetts). 
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almost any interest a person desires.192  This Section explores the 
collision of compelled subsidies jurisprudence and Indiana’s “In God We 
Trust” license plates, and the mixture of government and private speech 
that results.193 
Indiana’s “In God We Trust” license plate presents a unique conflict 
because it contains elements of Bredesen and Rose.194  In particular, the 
plate has been designated by Indiana’s BMV as both an alternative 
regular plate and a no-fee specialty plate.195  Although the circuit courts 
in Bredesen and Rose focused on whether the states had engaged in 
viewpoint discrimination, the analysis used by both courts highlights the 
complexity involved in determining the speaker with regard to the 
message on a license plate.196  As the dissent in Bredesen aptly noted, to 
view a license plate as purely government speech would oversimplify 
the situation.197  The Southern District Court of West Virginia, in West 
Virginia Ass’n of Club Owners and Fraternal Services, Inc. v. Musgrave,198 
acknowledged the lack of guidance from the Court in Johanns in 
determining “when the government is speaking and when it is 
                                                 
192 See Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles, supra note 191 (noting that Indiana developed 
specialty plates in 1977 and that currently, in Indiana, there are over 75 specialty plates 
available to choose from for an extra cost).  See also Massachusetts RMV Website, 
http://www.mass.gov/rmv/history/index.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2007) (noting that in 
1993, Massachusetts issued a high number of specialty plates). 
193 See infra Part III.B. 
194 See supra Part II.B and accompanying text (discussing differences between 
government and private speech in the context of license plates). 
195 See Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles:  Indiana’s License Plate, 
http://www.in.gov/bmv/plates/index.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2007) (noting that the 
“In God We Trust” license plate is a “‘no-fee’ specialty plate”); BMV Unveils ‘In God We 
Trust’ License Plate Design, http://www.insideindianabusiness.com/newsitem.asp?ID= 
19174 (last visited Nov. 10, 2007) (noting that “[n]o additional fee [beyond the standard 
charge] will be enforced for purchase of the [“In God We Trust”] plate, as is the case with 
all other specialty license plates[]”).  But see H.B. 1013, 114th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 
2006) (stating in the bill that “it is not a special group recognition license plate[]”); Indiana 
Bureau of Motor Vehicles: Indiana’s License Plate, http://www.in.gov/bmv/ 
platesandtitles/plates/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2007) (noting that this is the “state’s first 
alternative regular plate”). 
196 See supra Part II.B and accompanying text (noting that the Bredesen and Rose courts 
dealt with “Choose Life” specialty plates and determined whether the respective states 
engaged in viewpoint discrimination when permitting various pro-life organizations to 
create them). 
197 ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 380–85 (6th Cir. 2006) (Boyce, J., concurring 
in part, dissenting in part). 
198 512 F. Supp. 2d 424 (S.D. W.Va. 2007) (granting a preliminary motion, and concluding 
that a ban on limited video lottery advertising regulated private speech). 
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regulating private speech.”199  The district court synthesized other cases 
to reach its conclusion.200 
The Musgrave court articulated four guiding principles, which have 
developed from Johanns and other government speech cases.201  First, 
speech is more likely to be government speech if the message asserts an 
“overarching message.”202  Second, speech is more likely to be 
government speech if the government asserts a high “degree of 
control . . . over its purported message[.]”203  Third, speech is more likely 
to be government speech when the government funds the activity at 
issue or provides a benefit.204  Fourth, speech is more likely to be 
government speech when the government asserts a particular “rationale 
for insulating [itself] from normal First Amendment scrutiny when it is 
speaking[.]”205  To resolve the complexity of who is speaking—the 
government or private citizens—the Musgrave court then adopted the 
four-factor test elucidated in Rose.206  The Musgrave court noted that this 
four-factor test was consistent with the decision in Johanns and that, in 
certain situations, the speech occurring can be both government and 
private, as was the case in Rose.207  Therefore, even after Johanns, Rose’s 
four-factor test is best equipped to handle the conflicting speech that 
appears on license plates, especially specialized plates that bear a 
message.208 
Applying this four-factor test to the “In God We Trust” license plates 
produces a mixed result.209  The central purpose behind the “In God We 
Trust” plate presents a fascinating problem, in part because of 
                                                 
199 Id. at 432. 
200 Id. 
201 Id. 
202 Id.   
203 Id. 
204 Id. 
205 Id. (emphasizing that in such cases the government would be politically accountable 
for its message). 
206 Id. at 435.  The district court focused on the “level of control [that] the government can 
exercise over the content of the speech.”  Id. at 430.  If the government is speaking, it can 
select and tailor its message as it sees fit, whereas if the government engages in private 
speech, it is limited.  Id.  The Musgrave court also discussed in detail the government speech 
that was at issue in Rust, which was found permissible.  Id. at 430–31.  The Musgrave court 
concluded that the rationale behind allowing government speech to occur, as in Rust and 
other cases, was because the electorate can hold the speakers accountable if they do not like 
the message and use the ballot box in future elections to change the message.  Id. at 431. 
207 Id. at 433. 
208 See Choose Life Illinois, Inc. v. White, 547 F.3d 853, 863–64 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting that 
the Fourth Circuit’s four-factor test remains applicable when dealing with license plates).  
209 See infra notes 210–21 (describing the application of the four-factor test to Indiana’s 
plates). 
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Representative Burton’s mixed statements regarding the plate’s creation 
and the public reaction to its alleged purpose.210  Although Indiana likely 
wants to be identified as the speaker of the plate’s message so that the 
reasoning set forth in Johanns would apply—precluding a First 
Amendment challenge—if the government was identified as promoting 
a religious message, this could result in an Establishment Clause 
problem.211  The first element of the four-factor test—whether the 
government asserts an overarching message—more likely cuts in favor 
of government speech because the state was trying to promote a message 
as evidenced by Representative Burton’s statements.212  Similarly, the 
second factor of editorial control more likely cuts in favor of government 
speech because the message on Indiana’s “In God We Trust” license 
plate originated in the state legislature, and although private faith-based 
groups aided in crafting the design of the plate, the government 
maintained final editorial control.213  Similar to the facts and reasoning in 
Rose, where the South Carolina license plate originated with the state and 
the legislature chose the “Choose Life” message, Indiana too would 
likely be found as the creator of the message displayed on its “In God 
We Trust” plates.214 
                                                 
210 See supra notes 37, 176–78 and accompanying text.  See also Musgrave, 512 F. Supp. 2d 
at 433 (indicating that an important consideration related to the first factor of Rose’s four-
factor test in determining whether speech is government or private is whether the 
government seeks to raise revenue or  promote its message). 
211 See supra Parts II.A.1, II.B.1 (presenting various court cases and their respective 
reasoning as it relates to when a government display of religious symbols violates the 
Establishment Clause and when the government is impermissibly compelling a subsidy).   
212 See supra note 210.   
213 See supra note 133 and accompanying text (noting that Tennessee maintained editorial 
control over the “Choose Life” plate in Bredesen). 
214 See supra note 133 and accompanying text (referencing the factual scenario in Rose, 
where the state maintained primary control over the content of its “Choose Life” message 
leading the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals to find that the second factor of the four-factor 
test weighed in favor of South Carolina).  See also Musgrave, 512 F. Supp. 2d at 433–34 
(noting that the second factor is relevant only when the government promotes its message 
or when the government’s central purpose of its message is unclear).  If the central purpose 
is unclear—as it may be with the “In God We Trust” license plates—then the second factor 
of the test, editorial control, may shed light on the central purpose analysis used when 
determining the first factor.  Id. at 434.  “There is a correlation between the presence of a 
programmatic message and whether the second [ . . . ] factor favors a finding of 
government or private speech.  When courts determine that the first [ . . . ] factor favors a 
finding of government speech, they usually also find that the second [ . . . ] factor weighs in 
favor of government speech, and vice versa.”  Id. at 437.  The Musgrave court noted that if, 
however, the government promotes a message, then the remaining three factors are to be 
considered in determining whether the government’s message may be attributed to a 
private speaker.  Id.  The court noted that finding government speech based on the second 
factor helped prevent the message from being attributed to private speakers, in which case 
the government does not have to identify itself as the speaker.  Id. at 436–37.  The court 
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However, with regard to the third factor of this four-factor test—the 
identity of the speaker—the private owner would be the speaker because 
the plate is on the private owner’s vehicle and the private owner chose to 
display the message.215  As the district court in Musgrave concluded, “It is 
not difficult to think of situations where the owner of an item is different 
from the person speaking about the item.”216  The court noted that the 
technical ownership of the item, in Indiana’s case a license plate, was not 
always outcome determinative, but instead it was “ownership of the 
means of communication that was important.”217  Thus, the third factor 
cuts in favor of private speech because most people would likely identify 
the speaker to be the vehicle owner.218  Similarly, the fourth factor—who 
bears the ultimate responsibility for the speech—weighs in favor of the 
private individual, even if not as heavily, for the same rationale as the 
third factor.219  However, unlike in Rose where South Carolina charged a 
fee to display the “Choose Life” plates, Indiana does not charge a fee to 
display the “In God We Trust” plates.220  Nonetheless, applying the 
                                                                                                             
stated, “First Amendment issues may arise, however, when viewers identify government 
speech as private speech.”  Id. at 437. 
215 See supra notes 134–36 and accompanying text (noting that specialty license plates are 
often identified with the drivers and owners of vehicles).  See also Musgrave, 512 F. Supp. 2d 
at 434 (stressing that although the Court in Johanns did not address the third and fourth 
factors, it did not foreclose the use of these factors in future cases).  The district court, 
taking its guidance from the Supreme Court, cautioned against reading the principles in 
Rust too broadly.  Id. 
216 Id. at 437. 
217 Id. at 434. 
218 See supra notes 134–36 and accompanying text (discussing the four-factor test used by 
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Rose).  See also Musgrave, 512 F. Supp. 2d at 437 
(stating, “common sense suggests that the LVL [limited video lottery] retailers are the 
literal speakers when their own business names are at issue.  Similarly, passersby who 
view limited video lottery advertising will likely assume that the private establishment 
doing the advertising is the speaker, not the State of West Virginia[]”).  These situations 
parallel that of a license plate displayed on a motorist’s car. 
219 See supra note 134 (discussing specifically the third and fourth factors of the four part 
test used in Rose).  See also Musgrave, 512 F. Supp. 2d at 438 (cautioning that simply because 
the state creates the existence of the item in question does not always make it responsible 
for the speech put forth by private parties on that item).  The district court noted that 
simply because the state legalized the video lottery machines and was responsible for their 
existence did not mean the state was responsible for the speech put forth by the private 
LVL retailers on these machines.  Id.  If this premise were true, then the fourth factor 
“would always favor the government because the government can always be held 
responsible for its regulatory decisions.”  Id. 
220 See supra notes 6, 121 (noting that no additional fee is charged for choosing the “In 
God We Trust” license plate).  See supra notes 121–22 (noting that the dissent in Bredesen 
suggested that the compelled subsidy doctrine would apply if no fee were charged to 
individuals who selected the specialty license plates).  However, even under Johanns, the 
question of who is speaking would still need to be determined, and in the context of license 
plates, it appears that the four-factor test set-forth by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in 
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Fourth Circuit’s reasoning, Indiana’s license plates appear to carry mixed 
speech by both the government and the private vehicle owner.221 
Because Indiana’s “In God We Trust” license plates likely constitute 
mixed speech, the next issue to be decided is whether this mixture 
amounts to a compelled subsidy.222  A complication arises here because 
the message on a license plate is not easily identified with the 
government.223  If private speech is occurring, then Abood v. Detroit Board 
of Education224 should control the analysis, leading to the conclusion that 
a compelled subsidy, in theory, is taking place because the state is 
forcing taxpayers to pay for a private message with which they 
disagree.225  However, the Court’s expanding definition of government 
speech, and its continued erosion of taxpayer standing to challenge these 
claims, especially after Hein v. Religious Freedom Foundation,226 may 
prohibit such an action.227  Therefore, although a compelled subsidy 
claim might be actionable, unless a citizen of Indiana could demonstrate 
a sufficient emotional injury, his claim may be barred by the doctrines of 
taxpayer standing and generalized grievances.228  
                                                                                                             
Rose is the best tool for managing the complexities involved in addressing who is speaking.  
supra note 140. 
221 See supra notes 209–20 and accompanying text. 
222 See infra notes 223–27 and accompanying text. 
223 See infra Parts IV.A.–B. (noting the Court’s statement in Wooley that a license plate can 
serve as a mobile billboard).  See generally supra notes 220–22 (suggesting that Indiana’s “In 
God We Trust” plates seem to interplay the analysis of Johanns, but as explained above, the 
Fourth Circuit’s four-factored test seems better-equipped than Johanns pure government 
speech doctrine to analyze the issue). 
224 431 U.S. 209 (1977). 
225   Id. at 234–35 (recognizing that a person “should be free to believe as he will, and that 
in a free society one’s beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than 
coerced by the State[]”).  The Court referenced James Madison’s sentiments, “Who does not 
see . . . [t]hat the same authority which can force a citizen to contribute three pence only of 
his property for the support of any one establishment, may force him to conform to any 
other establishment in all cases whatsoever?”  Id. at 234 n.31.  However, in the past, 
taxpayers have subsidized copies of prayers that were collected and published in books for 
distribution to legislative members and nonmembers.  See Chambers v. Marsh, 675 F.2d 
228, 235 (8th Cir. 1982), rev’d, Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
226  Hein v. Religious Freedom Found., 127 S.Ct. 2553, 2568 (2007). 
227  See supra notes 33, 130 (discussing Hinrichs and the proposition that there is still a 
possible cause of action pursuant to the compelled subsidy doctrine if it can be shown that 
a person is affected emotionally by exposure to the license plate).   
228 See supra notes 223–27 and accompanying text. 
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IV.  PROPOSED COURT ANALYSIS:  MCCREARY SUGGESTS THAT CONTEXT AND 
PURPOSE MATTER IN ESTABLISHMENT CASES, AND WHO IS SPEAKING—
GOVERNMENT OR INDIVIDUAL—DETERMINES COMPELLED SUBSIDIES 
The problem with Indiana’s “In God We Trust” license plates is that, 
through them, Indiana appears to be on the cusp of violating both the 
Establishment Clause and compelled subsidy doctrines, but the plates 
nonetheless may escape invalidation.229  The crux of the problem 
emerges from the alleged purpose behind the plates and its coercive 
consequences; more particularly, the plate not only contains a religious 
message that is viewed as endorsing religion, but it also forces citizens of 
Indiana who disagree with the message to pay for other private citizens 
to display it.230  To avoid such a capricious outcome, this Note proposes 
that courts should adopt the six interpretative tools, articulated by 
Justice Breyer in Van Orden and McCreary, as a more nuanced approach 
to address an Establishment Clause challenge to Indiana’s “In God We 
Trust” plates if one were brought or in cases similar to it.231  
Furthermore, courts should apply Rose’s four-factor test when dealing 
with a mixed speech issue, which here resulted from the message on 
Indiana’s “In God We Trust” license plates.232  Such analysis leads to the 
conclusion that Indiana’s “In God We Trust” plate, in its current form, is 
unconstitutional.233 
                                                 
229 See infra notes 230–33 (discussing the Establishment Clause and compelled subsidy 
complications surrounding Indiana’s “In God We Trust” license plates and its 
unconstitutionality as currently administered).  See generally McCreary Cty., Ky. v. ACLU, 
545 U.S. 844 (2005).  Such a danger was reflected by both Jefferson when he “refused to 
issue Thanksgiving Proclamations because he believed that they violated the 
Constitution[,]” and Madison when he “criticized Virginia’s general assessment tax not just 
because it required people to donate ‘three pence’ to religion, but because ‘it is itself a 
signal of persecution.  It degrades from the equal rank of Citizens all those whose opinions 
in Religion do not bend to those of the Legislative authority.’”  Id. at 878. 
230 See supra Part III. 
231 See infra Part IV.A. 
232 See supra note 208 (referencing the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals holding in Choose 
Life Ill., Inc that Rose’s four factored test is still appropriate when dealing with speech issues 
and license plates).  See also supra notes 96, 116–20 (Such analysis would still permit a 
finding that would be consistent with the doctrine of government speech expounded in 
Johanns).  If the “In God We Trust” license plate were the sole official plate of the state and 
the only one available to residents at no extra cost, then the third and fourth factors would 
weigh more heavily to finding government speech because the government would more 
likely be affiliated as the literal speaker.  Supra notes 116–20.  Furthermore, the government 
would bear more of the direct responsibility for the speech because a driver would not 
have, in effect, the same choice as Indiana residents currently do.  Supra notes 116–20.   
233 See supra notes 19–21 (putting forth the proposed analysis a court should use if 
considering a law suit regarding Indiana’s “In God We Trust” license plates on 
Establishment Clause and compelled subsidy grounds).  See generally McCreary, 545 U.S. at 
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A. Navigating the Establishment Clause Waters:  Purpose, Perception, and 
Precedent 
Due to complex factual scenarios frequently presented to courts in 
Establishment Clause challenges and the tenuous balancing of free 
exercise, freedom of expression, and freedom of association concerns that 
often occurs, this Note proposes that Justice Breyer’s six interpretative 
tools would be the most effective and pragmatic method for analyzing 
religious displays by the government and whether Indiana’s “In God We 
Trust” plates violate the Establishment Clause.234  Justice Breyer applies 
his interpretive “tools” when reviewing litigation before the Court; he 
considers the text of the statute (or in this case the content of the display), 
history, tradition, precedent, the purpose of a statute (or here the 
purpose of the display), and the consequences of the law (or display).235  
His method incorporates the various perspectives of the Court—
separation, neutrality, and accommodation—while at the same time 
combining the three Establishment Clause tests of Lemon, endorsement, 
and coercion.236  Its application to Indiana’s “In God We Trust” plate 
would likely render the plate unconstitutional. 
If McCreary is not an aberration, then Indiana’s “In God We Trust” 
license plate likely violates the Establishment Clause because it lacks the 
                                                                                                             
908 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Post McCreary, where the majority sorted through the changing 
displays of the two Kentucky Courthouses, revealing the creators’ underlying religious 
purpose, it seems as though Indiana has found a way to move through the Court’s 
jurisprudence seemingly undetected).  Justice Scalia cautioned the Court of this fallacy 
when he stated,  
Displays erected in silence (and under the direction of good legal 
advice) are permissible, while those hung after discussion and debate 
are deemed unconstitutional.  Reduction of the Establishment Clause 
to such minutiae trivializes the Clause’s protection against religious 
establishment; indeed, it may inflame religious passions by making the 
passing comments of every government official the subject of endless 
litigation. 
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
234 See supra Parts II.A.1, III.A.1 (presenting Justice Breyer’s analysis, used when deciding 
Establishment Clause cases, and discussing how Justice Breyer utilizes his six interpretative 
tools to determine whether an Establishment Clause violation exists). 
235 See Lithwick, supra note 19.  Lithwick’s article discussed the debate between Justices 
Breyer and Scalia on Constitutional theory and their differing interpretations of how to 
analyze a case on review.  Id.  Justice Breyer claimed the Court would be misguided to not 
include the last two parts of his interpretive method, while Justice Scalia considered these 
last two parts too subjective and misleading.  Id.  Justice Breyer proclaimed that if only 
Constitutional truths mattered, then the Court should have nine historians instead of 
lawyers, to which Justice Scalia countered that such a scenario is better than having nine 
ethicists deciding the Constitutional fate of a case on his or her personal whim.  Id. 
236 See supra Parts II.A.1–2 and accompanying text (discussing various Establishment 
Clause cases and the analyses utilized by the courts in each case discussed).   
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required secular purpose and is therefore viewed as endorsing 
religion.237  Although the text of the statute that authorized the creation 
of the plates does not contain a blatant religious statement, the State of 
Indiana endorses religion by not charging a fee for the “In God We 
Trust” plate like it charges for other specialty plates.238  Just as the Ten 
Commandments could be displayed in either a sectarian or non-sectarian 
manner, this Note contends that the same argument can be made for the 
national motto, especially as used on Indiana’s license plate.239  Similarly, 
while the tradition and history of the phrase “In God We Trust” itself has 
become more secularized through the passage of time, it lacks any 
tradition of being placed on a license plate.240  In fact, in line with stare 
decisis, judicial precedent established in McCreary suggests that 
Representative Burton’s statements and continued efforts to promote the 
plates can be interpreted as his desire to advocate his strong religious 
convictions.  This inference is enhanced when viewed in the wake of 
legislative prayer litigation.241  Furthermore, Indiana’s actions lack 
                                                 
237 See supra notes 59–63 (discussing McCreary and its holding that the displays of the Ten 
Commandments were unconstitutional for endorsing religion). 
238 See supra notes 6, 169 and accompanying text (referring to the bill’s history and text). 
239 See supra note 169.  See Anthony Flecker, Comment, Though Shalt Make No Law 
Respecting an Establishment of Religion:  ACLU v. McCreary County, Van Orden v. Perry, and 
the Establishment Clause, 21 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT, 239, 247–49 (2006) (noting that 
drawing the distinction between government and private speech is critical in determining 
whether the speech is constitutional or violates the Establishment Clause).  Flecker further 
explored the dynamic of whether speech takes place in a public forum or on private 
property.  Id. at 248–49. 
240 See McCreary Cty., Ky. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 894 n.4 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
Even Justice Scalia, a member of the Court less likely than other members to find an 
Establishment Clause violation, recognized that the Ten Commandments could, depending 
on their use, violate the Establishment Clause.  Id.  See also supra notes 133–36 (applying 
Rose’s four-factor test).  Therefore, though it may be challenging to persuade the Court to 
determine that the National motto—“In God We Trust”—advances a religious message, 
this Note contends that, depending on the context in which this motto is used, it may 
indeed advance a religious message.  Supra notes 133–36.  Specifically, when the “In God 
We Trust” message appears on license plates, this raises the issue of attribution because a 
license plate is not similar to coinage or government buildings that are clearly 
representative of the government’s own message.  Supra notes 133–36.  Moreover, a person 
does not “choose” the coins or money that he or she carries in the same way that he or she 
“chooses” which license plate to display on his or her vehicle.  See supra note 136.  See also 
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977).  To be sure, as the Court suggested in Wooley, 
a person’s license plate is much more of a private billboard than the coins he or he 
possesses.  Id.  See generally supra note 136.  Therefore, when the “In God We Trust” 
message appears on an individual’s license plate, it advances a religious message.  See 
generally supra note 136. 
241 See supra notes 31–35 and accompanying text.  See generally McCreary, 545 U.S. at 863 
(Nevertheless, although the Court stated that “[a] secret motive stirs up no strife and does 
nothing to make outsiders of nonadherents, . . .” Representative Burton’s statements may 
not leave his intentions completely secret).   
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judicial precedent:  recent court decisions concerning license plates (Rose 
and Bredesen) have primarily dealt with viewpoint discrimination 
involving the “Choose Life” message—not Establishment Clause 
concerns.242   
Justice Breyer’s analytical tools provide a workable mode of analysis 
that, as demonstrated in McCreary, shed light on the true purpose behind 
the “In God We Trust” plates.243  Failure to utilize Justice Breyer’s 
analytical “tools” would allow Indiana’s General Assembly to hide 
behind their legislative methods to achieve their impermissible ends of 
endorsing religion.244  Indiana’s “In God We Trust” license plates may 
not fit neatly into the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence 
because of the phrase used; however, based on McCreary’s precedent, a 
court should find an Establishment Clause violation.245 
The “In God We Trust” license plate appears to violate even the 
tenets of an accomodationist’s perspective because the actions taken by 
the General Assembly appear to be preferential to a particular group at 
                                                 
242 See supra Part II.B (discussing issues concerning viewpoint discrimination in Bredesen 
and Rose). 
243 See supra Parts II.A.1, III.A (discussing the analysis Justice Breyer has applied in 
various Establishment Clause cases and how his six interpretative tools have contributed to 
this analysis). 
244 See supra Part III.A (suggesting that Indiana's “In God We Trust” license plates were 
created with an impermissible religious purpose).  See also supra note 233 (while Justice 
Scalia cautions that applying Justice Breyer’s six interpretive tools would cause 
government entities to hide their true religious motives—following, of course, the legal 
advice rendered by government lawyers—it follows from general criminal law principles 
that one is not punished for his or her mere thoughts, but is punished only when those 
thoughts are combined with action); supra Part II.A.2 (explaining that verbal expression 
combined with actions may create the appearance of endorsement within the community, 
leading to the coercive effects that the Establishment Clause is supposed to prohibit); supra 
note 58 (referencing Van Orden where Justice Breyer’s concurring vote stressed that the 
passage of time without objection and the true purpose behind the display was not to 
promote religion). 
245 See supra notes 62–63 (discussing McCreary’s holding finding the Ten Commandment 
displays in the two Kentucky County Courthouses unconstitutional).  The Court’s 
muddled Establishment Clause doctrines would likely permit the “In God We Trust” 
license plates because McCreary created a potential ambiguity and also because the 
composition of the Court has changed since McCreary was decided.  See CHEMERINSKY, 
supra note 18, at 1224–25.  The changed composition of the Court, with Justice Alito having 
replaced Justice O’Connor, likely leaves Justice Kennedy with the deciding vote, and he is 
not likely to find an Establishment Cause violation.  Id.  This Note therefore acknowledges 
that the current Court would likely find the “In God We Trust” license plate constitutional, 
but contends that such a result should not be the case.  Supra notes 62–63 (again suggesting 
McCreary’s holding should control a court’s decision regarding the “In God We Trust” 
license plates). 
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the expense of others.246  While the Court has concluded that the 
Establishment Clause must differentiate between the “real threat and 
mere shadow[,]”247 it must not be forgotten that sometimes lurking in the 
shadows are threats more dangerous than those readily apparent.248  
Indiana’s “In God We Trust” license plate lacks the required secular 
purpose, can be viewed as endorsing religion, and may have 
psychologically coercive effects on its citizens; thus, it should be found 
unconstitutional.249 
B. “Compelling” a Controversy:  A Fair Tax, Equitable Results 
Similarly, the “In God We Trust” message contained on the license 
plates reflects both private and government speech, which is not 
embraced by all, yet is being paid for by all taxpayers.250  The Court’s 
reasoning in compelled subsidy challenges post-Johanns implies that 
messaging rarely will violate the Constitution, provided that any trace of 
the government can be found as the speaker, whether the government’s 
identification is hidden or not.251  Yet, Indiana’s “In God We Trust” 
license plate is dissimilar to government buildings, government-issued 
money, or even the only official state plate or flag.252  Unlike these 
traditional medium, the Indiana’s “In God We Trust” license plates are a 
far more unique medium, in which the speech that is occurring is mixed, 
as the Fourth Circuit’s four-factor test more appropriately 
demonstrates.253  Unlike license plates that promote the environment, the 
home state university, or other special interests, which are paid for by 
those who choose to pay an extra fee to place it on their automobile, 
Indiana’s “In God We Trust” license plate is subsidized by taxes of all 
residents, whether citizen “A” chose the “In God We Trust” license plate 
or not.254 
                                                 
246 But see generally Kolenc, supra note 165 (describing what the world would be like in 
Justice Scalia’s neighborhood, as the author phrased it, if Justice Scalia’s views regarding 
the Establishment Clause and accommodation of religion were adopted by a majority).  
Kolenc’s piece explores the test that Justice Scalia would use in lieu of Lemon’s three-
pronged approach—the actual coercion test annunciated in Lee.  Id. at 831–35.  Kolenc 
suggested that Justice Scalia’s accomodationist approach would be more protective of and 
appealing to minority religions than that of a strict separationist approach.  Id. at 836–70. 
247 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 598 (1992). 
248 See supra Part III.A. 
249 See supra Part III.A. 
250 See supra Part III.B. 
251 See supra Part II.B. 
252 See supra Part II.B. 
253 See supra Part III.B. 
254 See supra Part I. 
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Given this scenario, some Indiana residents who choose the “In God 
We Trust” plate may choose the plate for its religious message, while 
others may advocate national pride because the message is the national 
motto.  Either way, Indiana’s “In God We Trust” plate carries a message 
that is affiliated with a private person and is paid for by taxpayers who 
may not agree with the message.255  As the Court in Everson stated, “No 
tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious 
activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form 
they may adopt to teach or practice religion.”256  These sentiments 
should still ring true today.  Yet, Flast’s progeny, resulting in the 
increasing restrictions on standing, and the recent decision in Johanns, 
which expanded the amount of speech falling outside First Amendment 
analysis when the government is the speaker, suggest that a compelled 
subsidy argument would be unsuccessful.257  Nevertheless, a potentially 
impermissible act should not be able to escape judicial scrutiny merely 
because of crafty engineering. 
Even if “In God We Trust” plates are considered government speech, 
the conclusion that government is forcing citizens to subsidize speech 
(that some people perceive as containing a religious message) should 
lead courts to question the constitutionality of the “In God We Trust” 
license plates.258  Furthermore, using the mixed speech analysis from 
Rose, a court should apply the four-factor test set forth in Rose and 
Musgrave, which invokes many of the same elements as Justice Breyer’s 
six interpretive tools used to assess Establishment Clause issues.259  The 
four-factor test focuses on the central purpose behind the law (or in this 
case the display):  (1) Was the law or display designed to promote a 
government message (purpose)?; (2) Who has editorial control of the 
message—the government or private entity (the text)?; (3) What is the 
                                                 
255 See supra notes 209–21. 
256 Everson v Ewing Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (explaining examples of practices 
that the Establishment Clause is designed to prohibit). 
257 See supra notes 227–28.  See also Hein v. Religious Freedom Foundation, 127 S. Ct. 2553, 
2568 (2007) (dismissing the argument that the President’s faith-based initiative program 
was invalid; although upholding Flast’s narrow exception to taxpayer standing while 
refusing to expand it to apply to the issue presented in the litigation).  As it stands, Hein 
seems to suggest that the Court is not willing to expand Flast’s exception anytime soon.  Id. 
at 2569.  On the other hand, Indiana’s “In God We Trust” license plate poses a different 
issue than the issues raised in the other cases because the “In God We Trust” message on 
the state-issued license plates is not as clearly identified with the government.  See Olree, 
supra note 7, at 213 (noting that a specialized license plate is different than pure 
government speech); supra note 140 (discussing Rose and the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals decision in Choose Life Ill., Inc. reiterating that messages on license plates can 
contain a mixture of government and private speech).  
258 See supra Parts III.A–B. 
259 See supra Parts III.B, IV.A. 
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identity of the actual speaker—the government or private person (akin to 
history, tradition, and precedent)?; (4) Who bears the ultimate 
responsibility for the message—again, the government or a private entity 
(equating to the consequences of the law or display)?260  As applied to 
Indiana’s “In God We Trust” license plate, this four-factor test 
demonstrates, as discussed above in Part III, that the plate contains 
mixed speech, resulting in citizens paying for the “In God We Trust” 
message regardless of whether they agree with it. 
V.  CONCLUSION:  GUIDING PRINCIPLES 
Indiana’s “In God We Trust” plates have spawned strong reactions 
from supporters and critics alike.261  Indiana’s General Assembly could 
have avoided potential Establishment Clause and compelled subsidy 
concerns regarding the “In God We Trust” license plate by clearly 
categorizing the plate as a specialty plate and charging an administrative 
fee to cover the cost of production similar to the fee charged for other 
specialty plates.262  Moreover, to further the alleged secular purpose of 
the plate, the state could have collected organizational fees and 
contributed those fees to a secular organization, much like Tennessee did 
when it contributed the money it collected from the sales of its specialty 
license plates to the Bald Eagle Foundation.263  Instead, Indiana chose not 
to charge any fees because it wanted to avoid potential issues that could 
result from the monies going to a religious organization for a plate that is 
purportedly secular in purpose and effect.  However, in doing so the 
Indiana General Assembly may have created more problems then it 
likely contemplated. 
McCreary suggests that Indiana’s “In God We Trust” license plates 
violate the Establishment Clause because these plates lack the requisite 
secular purpose, endorse religion, and may have a coercive effect on 
Indiana citizens.  Furthermore, the four-factor test set forth by the Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, when applied to the “In God We Trust” license 
plate, leads to the conclusion that the license plate contains mixed 
speech, resulting in a First Amendment compelled subsidy violation.  
However, the Supreme Court’s expanding definition of government 
speech and the continual erosion of the Flast exception may leave 
Indiana citizens with less ability to challenge the General Assembly’s 
actions because few will be able to demonstrate the personal harm 
                                                 
260 See supra Part IV.A. 
261 See supra Part II. 
262 See supra Parts I, II. 
263 See supra Parts II, IV. 
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required for standing.264  Nevertheless, Indiana’s “In God We Trust” 
license plate in its current form is unconstitutional, and the Indiana 
General Assembly should charge an extra fee similar to any other 
specialty plate that promotes a message.  And as license plates 
displaying personal messages or other special interests continue to grow 
in popularity, future legislatures and reviewing courts should closely 
examine the plates, utilizing the interpretative tools and tests described 
above because the plates present a real threat. 
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